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Detweiler: Breaking Bread and the Law: Criminalizing Homelessness and First

BREAKING BREAD AND THE LAW:
CRIMINALIZING HOMELESSNESS AND FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN PUBLIC PARKS
I. INTRODUCTION
Fort Lauderdale police arrested ninety-year-old Arnold Abbott on
November 5, 2014.1 Mr. Abbott, a World War II veteran and chef, started
Love Thy Neighbor Fund Inc. in 1991 so he could make nutritious and
healthy meals for the homeless community of Fort Lauderdale, Florida. 2
Every Wednesday for two decades, Mr. Abbott served hundreds of meals
on the beach to the homeless without interruption. 3 However, the City of
Fort Lauderdale recently enacted several food sharing ordinances that put
Mr. Abbott at odds with the law. 4 After violating the new fooddistribution ordinance, police officers arrested, fined, and ordered Mr.
Abbott to appear in court.5
1
See U.S. Activist Faces Jail for Feeding Homeless, ALJAZEERA (Nov. 8, 2014),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2014/11/us-activist-faces-jail-feedinghomeless201211844435503178.html [https://perma.cc/JK2R-PQA2] [hereinafter U.S.
Activist] (characterizing Mr. Abbott’s arrest after he violated a newly enacted city ordinance
pertaining to food-distribution on public property).
2
See id. (discussing Mr. Abbott’s role as a chef and his service during World War II); see
also Mission and Vision, LOVE THY NEIGHBOR, http://lovethyneighbor.org/aboutus/mission/ [https://perma.cc/4MQW-KZ9Y] (explaining the mission and vision of Love
Thy Neighbor, Inc.).
3
See U.S. Activist, supra note 1 (describing Mr. Abbott’s history of feeding the homeless
every Wednesday for two decades).
4
See Robbie Couch, Fort Lauderdale Passes Law That Restricts Feeding Homeless People,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/03/fortlauderdale-feeding-homeless_n_6094234.html [https://perma.cc/UE5X-FCYZ] (stating Fort
Lauderdale passed an ordinance on October 22, 2014, that limited where groups and
individuals could feed the homeless on public property and mandated making portable
toilets available before feeding the homeless). The Mayor insisted that Mr. Abbott “was not
arrested and taken into custody.” Amy Sherman, Jack Seiler Says Arnold Abbott, 90-Year-Old,
Wasn’t Taken into Custody for Feeding Homeless, POLITIFACT (Nov. 17, 2014),
http://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/2014/nov/17/jack-seiler/jack-seiler-saysarnold-abbott-90-year-old-wasnt-t/ [https://perma.cc/6GE3-92D9]. According to the
police captain, Mr. Abbott’s arrest was similar to a misdemeanor, where an arrestee is not
taken into custody because he or she is allowed to “just show up in court and let a judge
decide the case.” Id. Several local defense attorneys explained that officers have discretion
on whether to take misdemeanants into custody. See id. (interviewing several unaffiliated
police officers and defense attorneys).
5
See Sherman, supra note 4 (explaining Mr. Abbott violated the new food distribution
ordinance on November 2, 2014, for failing to provide portable toilets). Before issuing the
third violation, officers allowed Mr. Abbott to feed everyone who attended his fooddistribution event before issuing him his third citation. See U.S. Activist, supra note 1
(reporting the officers’ response to Mr. Abbott’s willful violation of the new city ordinance).
The officers also explained that they were upholding the law, and they needed to “balance
the needs of the entire population of the city.” Id.
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Although the city allowed Mr. Abbott to continue feeding the
homeless, the food-sharing laws created several restrictions and
requirements.6 Similar to Fort Lauderdale, restricting the distribution of
food to the homeless on public property is a tactic some cities across the
country have enacted to appease complaints about the homeless in public
areas.7 In some cities, ordinances channel food distribution to different
areas or specifically regulate food distribution by requiring groups to meet
particular safety and health standards. 8 Another more odious method
cities use to restrict food-distribution on public property is permit
requirements.9
Consequently, these ordinances have negatively affected groups who
desire to feed the homeless.10 When ordinances discourage group
feedings in public parks, the homeless have fewer meal options because
other agencies cannot meet the demand for food assistance. 11 In addition
6
See Sherman, supra note 4 (listing the contents of the newly enacted outdoor fooddistribution ordinance: (1) individuals cannot feed the homeless within 500 feet of
residential areas; (2) groups must provide portable toilets and provide hand washing
equipment; and (3) consent from the property owner is required).
7
See NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, SHARE NO MORE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
EFFORTS TO FEED PEOPLE IN NEED 4 (Michael Stoops ed., 2014), http://nationalhomeless.org/
wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Food-Sharing2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y5T4-DJWL]
[hereinafter SHARE NO MORE] (noting cities across the United States are enacting new
legislation impacting food distribution as part of an effort to push the homeless problem out
of sight).
8
See FT. LAUDERDALE, FLA. MUN. CODE § 47-18.31(C)(2)(a)(iii) (2015) (obligating outdoor
food distribution centers to remain 500 feet away from residential property and mandating
compliance with state, county, or city food-service requirements).
9
See SHARE NO MORE, supra note 7, at 4 (reporting that between 2013 and 2014, twelve
major cities passed ordinances requiring individuals and groups to apply for permits before
distributing food to the homeless on public property).
10
See id. at 9, 10, 12 (reporting some groups have stopped applying for permits because
their applications were arbitrarily denied, processing fees were cost prohibitive, and groups
were funneled away from convenient downtown locations); see also Couch, supra note 4
(interviewing local food advocate Micah Harris who runs The Peanut Butter and Jelly
Project). The Peanut Butter and Jelly Project relies on volunteers and donations to serve daily
meals to the homeless in Fort Lauderdale, which “has helped [thirty-six] people get off the
street.” Couch, supra note 4. These people are “literally starving on the streets,” claimed one
advocate, and these groups help alleviate the daily struggles of the homeless. Id.
11
See SHARE NO MORE, supra note 7, at 11 (explaining the homeless in Lake Worth, Florida
have fewer options for meals because the homeless population is increasing and public foodsharing by large groups is decreasing). A December 2014 survey of major cities across the
United States revealed that emergency food assistance programs are unable to adequately
meet the demand for emergency food assistance. See HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS SURVEY:
A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA’S CITIES, U.S. CONFERENCE OF
MAYORS 11 (2014), http://www.usmayors.org/pressrelease/uploads/2014/1211-reporthh.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7CQ-ARF4] [hereinafter CONFERENCE OF MAYORS] (pointing out
that eight-two percent—eighteen of twenty-five cities with food pantries and emergency
kitchens—reduced the quantity of food people could receive due to a lack of resources and
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to erasing resources, these ordinances infringe on the First Amendment
rights of groups that use food sharing as a form of speech.12
This Note argues that food distribution is protected, symbolic speech
and that food-sharing ordinances throughout the United States fail to
protect the constitutional rights of homeless advocates. First, Part II
provides background information about homelessness in the United
States and First Amendment jurisprudence.13 Then, Part III examines
food-sharing ordinances that incidentally burden the speech of homeless
advocates or create prior restraints. 14 Last, Part IV offers a model
ordinance that cities should adopt to protect the First Amendment rights
of homeless advocates while respecting cities’ ability to regulate public
space.15

an increase in demand, which also resulted in denying people services in seventy-seven
percent of the major cities). To address food insecurity, cities provide healthy food programs
via schools, mobile farmer’s markets, mobile food pantries, and other service agencies. Id. at
12. But, these efforts are limited, and cities that prevent groups from feeding the homeless
in public parks seem to counteract efforts to address hunger, especially as emergency
kitchens ration limited resources. Id. at 11. One explanation for this counteractive response
is community groups engaging in “not in my backyard” (“NIMBY”) politics. See Eliza
Barclay, More Cities Are Making It Illegal to Hand out Food to the Homeless, NPR (Oct. 22, 2014),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2014/10/22/357846415/more-cities-are-making-itillegal-to-hand-out-food-to-the-homeless [https://perma.cc/D8RZ-FMU9] (emphasizing
that legislation against food-sharing is a NIMBYism). Nonetheless, local governments must
realize that the homeless depend on emergency aid until long-term solutions materialize,
such as affordable housing, employment, and social services. See CONFERENCE OF MAYORS,
supra note 11, at 36 (noting that using federal programs and charitable, national initiatives to
alleviate homelessness have been successful in the past).
Food insecurity is a major issue in the United States, affecting not only the homeless but
households as well. See ALISHA COLEMAN-JENSEN ET AL., HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY IN THE
UNITED STATES IN 2013, i (2014), http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1565415/err173.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F2Z3-B9L9] (claiming that 14.3 percent of households in the United States
“were food insecure at least some time during the year, including 5.6 percent with very low
food security”). Thus, for people facing food insecurity, one or more household members’
food intake was reduced and “their eating patterns were disrupted at times during the year
because the household lacked money and other resources for food.” Id. Food insecurity is
likely even more problematic because homeless families and individuals were omitted from
this study. See id. at 11 (arguing that by leaving out the homeless, statistics get driven down,
which may be substantial).
12
See infra Part III (arguing that food sharing on public property is symbolic speech).
13
See infra Part II (narrating the history of the homeless in the United States and outlining
First Amendment jurisprudence related to speech in public parks).
14
See infra Part III (analyzing permit schemes and incidental burdens on speech).
15
See infra Part IV (providing a model ordinance for cities to adopt).
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II. BACKGROUND
Public parks and other public property have traditionally provided a
forum for political discourse and public commentary. 16 Distributing food
to the homeless in public parks is a form of political discourse that must
receive protection against laws that seek to relocate or ban the voice of
homeless advocates.17 The First Amendment is one avenue of relief
against ordinances that directly or indirectly affect food sharing. 18 First,
Part II.A will explain historical trends of the criminalization of the
homeless in the United States to provide a context for current restrictions
on public space.19 Then, Part II.B outlines First Amendment jurisprudence
relating to symbolic speech and regulations that receive intermediate
scrutiny.20 Last, Part II.C offers information regarding permit schemes
and the threat of prior restraints. 21

16
See RANDALL P. BEZANSON, TOO MUCH FREE SPEECH? 68 (2012) (revealing that the
concept of a traditional public forum, such as streets, parks, and sidewalks, took on a “more
speech-protective character” during the decades following the 1970s, “which allowed claims
of access to a wide range of other public facilities and locations”); see also MURRAY DRY, CIVIL
PEACE AND THE QUEST FOR TRUTH: THE FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS IN POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 208–15 (2004) (articulating the
development of the public forum doctrine that protects speech on public property).
However, not all public property receives protection under the First Amendment via the
public forum doctrine. See Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1115, 1145 (2005) (distinguishing public forum status from unprotected
property such as government-owned offices and state prisons, which fall outside the public
forum doctrine). Even though lower courts have applied the public forum doctrine when
analyzing whether people have a right to access information in public libraries, the Supreme
Court refused to extend this doctrine to expressive conduct taking place in public libraries.
See Elizabeth Henselee, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Public Forum: Why a Public
Forum Analysis Applied to the Library Should Protect Internet Services and Delivery Systems, 43
CAP. U. L. REV. 777, 778–80 (2015) (asserting that the Court should revisit the public forum
analysis regarding the implementation of filtering software in public libraries).
17
See infra Part III.A (arguing that feeding the homeless in public parks is symbolic speech
that people use to advocate on behalf of the homeless).
18
See infra Part II.B.2 (highlighting that some city ordinances indirectly impact speech
even though they are primarily concerned about regulating conduct on public property).
19
See infra Part II.A.1 (chronicling the historical development of homelessness in the
United States and the history of criminalizing the homeless during different eras).
20
See infra Part II.B (describing when speech receives First Amendment protection and
the types of regulations that cities may use to limit speech rights of groups and individuals).
21
See infra Part II.C (noting that cities frequently use permit schemes to control food
sharing in public parks and potential negative implications these laws have on groups that
use food distribution to advocate for the needs of the homeless).
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A. Criminalization of the Homeless
Throughout United States history, society has often viewed the
homeless with indifference, fear, and contempt. 22 Before discussing new
efforts in the twenty-first century to criminalize the homeless, it is
important to understand how this mindset weaved itself into the public
fabric. First, Part II.A.1 explores the historical progression of laws
affecting the homeless.23 Second, Part II.A.2 explains the difficulty of
defining homelessness and some of the efforts to criminalize the
homeless.24
1.

Historical Overview of Cities’ Responses to Homeless Populations

Since colonial times, cities and towns have decided how to extend
welfare to indigent populations.25 For example, when community
members faced economic hardship, they could rely on assistance from the
community to support their needs. 26 People attained community
membership by being born into an accepted family or by vote in town hall
meetings.27 However, the law failed to create a duty to provide for

22
See PETER H. ROSSI, DOWN AND OUT IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF HOMELESSNESS 17
(1989) (explaining society’s view of the homeless throughout history).
23
See supra Part II.A.1 (chronicling community perceptions and treatment of the homeless
by cities throughout history).
24
See supra Part II.A.2 (highlighting that no clear definition of homelessness exists and
listing laws that criminalize the homeless).
25
See Ellen M. Marks, Note, Ordinances Targeting the Homeless: Constitutional or CostEffective?, 19 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 437, 438–39 (2013) (writing that American
colonies adopted Elizabethan poor laws from England, which “remained in force until the
early nineteenth century”). These colonial laws were influenced by a variety of English
statutes that punished vagrants. See SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, ENGLISH POOR LAW
HISTORY: PART 1: THE OLD POOR LAW 24 n.1 (1963) (casting light on English laws that
tolerated punishing the poor via compulsory service by a master, whipping bare backs until
bloody, branding, and condemnation).
26
See ROSSI, supra note 22, at 17 (stating how colonial communities taxed community
members to provide three years of provisions for economically strapped members).
Homeless advocates today are calling for a community approach to address the systemic
problem of homelessness that carries on the spirit of the early attempts to provide for people
in need. See NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY & NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS,
FEEDING INTOLERANCE: PROHIBITIONS ON SHARING FOOD WITH PEOPLE EXPERIENCING
HOMELESSNESS,
8
(2007),
http://nationalhomeless.org/publications/foodsharing/
Food_Sharing.pdf [https://perma.cc/S773-JWHG] [hereinafter FEEDING INTOLERANCE]
(recommending that cities collaborate with food providers, encourage restaurants to accept
food stamps, and provide summer food programs).
27
See ROSSI, supra note 22, at 17 (describing the process that new members went through
to attain settlement rights in colonial communities). Settlement requirements persisted into
the 1960s, while harsher practices such as debtors’ prisons and whipping unrepentant
beggars disappeared during the first two centuries. See GREG M. SHAW, THE WELFARE
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nonmembers who were considered public charges. 28 In fact, nonmembers
who needed public assistance were warned to leave town or face being
transported to the jurisdiction’s boundaries. 29 “[T]hus . . . a kind of
transient poor [arose], shunted from community to community because in
place after place they were denied settlement rights.”30 These harsh
attitudes towards the homeless continued into the nineteenth century. 31
During economic downturns, cities reverted to rounding up the idle and
poor.32 Despite their contribution to the industrial movement of the late
nineteenth century, the transient homeless were not respected members
of society.33
DEBATE 1 (2007) (commenting on welfare laws and practices that were adopted from Europe
by American colonies).
28
See ROSSI, supra note 22, at 17 (discussing entitlements guaranteed to community
members and non-community members, which resulted in self-sufficiency assessments
before accepting people into the community).
29
See id. (portraying the plight of widows, children, the disabled, and the aged adults who
were likely to rely on the public for assistance).
30
Id. See also TODD DEPASTINO, CITIZEN HOBO: HOW A CENTURY OF HOMELESSNESS
SHAPED AMERICA 6 (2003) (explaining that transients were seen as particularly dangerous in
colonial New England, which fostered harsh punishments such as flogging, branding, and
ear cropping if the homeless could not explain their reasons for wandering around a town).
According to DePastino, “[V]agrancy statutes legitimized and facilitated the mobility of
better-off transients while discouraging and criminalizing the movement of the poor.” Id.
31
See PAUL OCOBOCK, CAST OUT: VAGRANCY AND HOMELESSNESS IN GLOBAL AND
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 18 (A. L. Beier & Paul Ocobock eds., 2008) (asserting that the
colonial rhetoric of the evil vagrant continued into the nineteenth century).
32
See id. at 18–19 (pointing out that American cities shared many characteristics with the
rest of the world in how they treated the poor during prosperity and stagnated economies).
One scholar argues that war, economic crises, and other demographic changes caused
authorities to vacillate between repression and indifference towards homeless populations,
especially when crime and unemployment increased in nineteenth-century cities. Id. See also
DEPASTINO, supra note 30, at 4 (stating in response to growing numbers of tramps, cities
called for mass arrests, chain gangs, workhouses, poor houses hazing, and food poisoning
by putting strychnine or arsenic in their meat to drive away the homeless during times of
repression). According to DePastino:
Tramps were both victims and agents of the new economic system,
itinerant laborers clinging beneath the speeding freight train of
industrial capitalist expansion. Because they seemed strange and
placeless—“here to-day [sic] and gone tomorrow”—tramps served as
convenient screens onto which middle-class Americans projected their
insecurities, anxieties, and fantasies about urban industrial life.
Id.
33
See ERIC H. MONKKONEN, WALKING TO WORK: TRAMPS IN AMERICA 9, 11 (1984) (noting
the poor provided cheap labor for developing cities and railroads throughout the county, yet
society never fully integrated the poor and jailed them when demand for labor waned).
Given the city planning at this time, the upper and middle class citizens lived relatively close
to homeless slums, and communities viewed homeless as a “dangerous class[]” due to the
fear of crime associated with slum dwellers. See SHAW, supra note 27, at 27–28 (commenting
on societal attitudes towards the poor during the 1800s). The relationship between
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During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the homeless
became more institutionalized and segregated throughout cities in the
United States.34 Skid rows started popping up to house poor, transient
men, especially during the Great Depression. 35 Skid rows remained until
the 1950s and 1960s, but cities increased the demolition of cheap living
quarters that housed the homeless during the 1970s and 1980s; the
homeless creeped into the public eye as fewer accommodations existed. 36
These efforts to remove homeless accommodations forced the public to
interact with homeless individuals.37
Despite the influx of emergency shelters and public assistance
programs since the 1970s, society continued to face the question of how to
interact with people living on the streets. 38 The number of current
homeless persons in the United States has fluctuated as more people
started facing homelessness, but the old homeless of the mid 1900s usually
found cheap shelters in skid rows or dilapidated motels.39 The homeless
unsanitary living conditions and disease also contributed to the negative perception of the
poor as smallpox, cholera, typhoid, and other diseases could easily spread to well-off
neighborhoods given their close proximity to the slums. Id. at 28.
34
See ROSSI, supra note 22, at 20 (noting a shift away from transiency that characterized
homeless populations during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century). States
and cities also created poorhouses to accommodate the less transient, such as those who were
unable to care for themselves, criminals, and the mentally ill; however, it was easier to enter
a poorhouse than leave one given the perverse qualities of the facilities. See SHAW, supra note
27, at 23–24 (examining institutions that housed the poor during the nineteenth century and
policy debates regarding their management).
35
See ROSSI, supra note 22, at 22 (writing about the rise of skid rows in major cities that
served as miniature communities for the transient homeless, especially during the 1930s that
was marked by economic hardship). This period also started the decline of transient
homeless who could crisscross the country to find employment, and “in their place had
grown up a new homeless population that [were] . . . permanently unemployed . . . [with] no
chance of ever finding steady work.” Id.
36
See id. at 33–34 (noting the striking changes that took place in cities across the country
during the 1970s and 1980s). Relaxed police enforcement for status crimes also allowed the
homeless to find refuge in the streets. Id. at 34.
37
See id. at 34 (stating the uncomfortable sight of “shabbily dressed persons acting in
bizarre ways, muttering, shouting, and carrying bulky packages or pushing supermarket
carts filled with junk and old clothes” filled the streets of cities that destroyed shanty towns).
38
See id. at 35–36 (chronicling the emergence of shelters and housing in response to
displaced homeless persons during the last part of the twentieth century). Other welfare
reforms during the 1990s, such as tax credits, public medical insurance, child support
enforcement, and child-care subsidies, have helped low-wage workers avoid dipping into
homelessness, but these laws primarily benefit people with a wage earner in the home while
families without a wage earner receive less support and face a more tenuous situation. See
REBECCA M. BLANK ET AL., WORKING AND POOR: HOW ECONOMIC AND POLICY CHANGES ARE
AFFECTING LOW-WAGE WORKERS 2–3 (2006) (reporting on the benefits of welfare reforms
while noting the policy impacts on the unemployed).
39
See ROSSI, supra note 22, at 37–38 (detailing the number of homeless in the United States
according to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and population
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today face “more severe basic shelter deprivation[s].” 40 In addition to
grappling with the homeless, society has struggled to define
“homelessness,” which is discussed in the following Part.41
2.

Defining Homelessness and Efforts to Criminalize the Homeless

There is no clear definition of “homelessness.” 42 During the
nineteenth century, the homeless consisted of immigrant workers, Civil
War veterans, and other young men who had limited education and low

surveys); see also MONKKONEN, supra note 33, at 11 (describing the role of the homeless during
the Industrial Revolution and their ability to find cheap housing in cities throughout the
United Sates).
40
ROSSI, supra note 22, at 39. In addition to housing issues, various people transition in
and out of homelessness because trends such as income inequality, world trade, labor-saving
technological advances, immigration, and declines in married couples affect employment
and earning abilities. BLANK ET AL., supra note 38, at 2.
41
See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the difficulty of formulating a clear definition of
“homelessness”).
42
See Jennifer E. Watson, Note, When No Place Is Home: Why the Homeless Deserve Suspect
Classification, 88 IOWA L. REV. 501, 503 (2003) (explaining that a clear definition of
homelessness does not exist). The Public Health and Welfare title of the United States Code
defines homelessness as the following:
(1) an individual who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime
residence;
(2) an individual or family with a primary nighttime residence that is a
public or private place not designed for or ordinarily used as a regular
sleeping accommodation for human beings, including a car, park,
abandoned building, bus or train station, airport, or camping ground;
(3) an individual or family living in a supervised publicly or privately
operated shelter designated to provide temporary living arrangements
(including hotels and motels paid for by Federal, State, or local
government programs for low-income individuals or by charitable
organizations, congregate shelters, and transitional housing);
(4) an individual who resided in a shelter or place not meant for human
habitation and who is exiting an institution where he or she temporarily
resided.
42 U.S.C. § 11302(a)(1)–(a)(4) (2012). The same title also defines the homeless as:
The term “homeless individual” means an individual who lacks
housing (without regard to whether the individual is a member of a
family), including an individual whose primary residence during the
night is a supervised public or private facility that provides temporary
living accommodations and an individual who is a resident in
transitional housing.
§ 254b(h)(5)(A). The definition of homelessness may also vary within different studies that
track the number of homeless. See Farida Ali, Note, Limiting the Poor’s Right to Public Space:
Criminalizing Homelessness in California, 21 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 197, 200 (2014)
(opining that estimates about the homeless population depend on how the study defines
homelessness). Sometimes, homelessness is “broadly defined to include those persons
without adequate housing or at a high risk of homelessness.” Id.
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job skills.43 The homeless in the 1930s were defined as transients who were
unemployed, destitute, and had nobody to care for them.44 During an
economic boom following World War II, “[t]he stereotypical homeless
person was a single white male skid row bum subsisting on mission
charity and fortified wine.”45 The period between the 1970s and 1990s cast
new light on perceptions of homelessness, however, and the conversation
changed from social deviants to people impacted by structural
determinants such as economic decline, gentrification, reduced public
Today, the United States
benefits, and deinstitutionalization. 46
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) defines
chronically homeless individuals as “unaccompanied homeless
individuals with disabilities who have either been continuously homeless
for a year or more or have experienced at least four episodes of
homelessness in the last three years.”47
Additionally, the number of homeless has fluctuated since the Great
Recession.48 Nineteen major cities in the United States reported an
43
See ROSSI, supra note 22, at 19 (portraying the people who made up the homeless
population during the nineteenth century).
44
See id. at 25 (describing the population of homeless sheltered by the City of Chicago
during 1933 and 1934).
45
See DON MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE FIGHT FOR PUBLIC
SPACE 178–79 (2003) (arguing that discourse about the reasons for homelessness during the
1970s and 1980s changed society’s perception of the homeless). This perception coincided
with the individualist tradition that advocated for self-betterment because addressing
structural causes was ineffectual while addressing personal failings was an easier remedy.
See SHAW, supra note 27, at 43 (casting light on the perceptions of the homeless and different
policy debates regarding the poor that existed during the 1800s and early 1900s).
46
See MITCHELL, supra note 45, at 179 (stating that the explosion of the homeless
population that absorbed women, children, and whole families cast new light on the reasons
for homelessness). In the spirt of self-betterment that was characterized by the up-by-yourbootstraps mentality, professionalism within the area of social work started to take hold,
which focused more intently on targeting individuals. SHAW, supra note 27, at 43. The central
philosophy of social workers during this time was that “intensive casework . . . could teach
improved living skills.” Id. However, more knowledge about the human psyche shifted the
social work field away from the focus on poverty to giving considerable attention to mental
health issues. Id. Additionally, the field of social work had stark, contrasting views about
the role of private relief versus public relief, with the latter ultimately winning as people
realized that poverty hinged on economic habits of laying people off “with very little thought
of the implications for those who would lose their jobs.” Id. at 44.
47
MEGHAN HENRY ET AL., THE 2014 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT REPORT TO CONGRESS
(AHAR) 2 (2014), https://www.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/2014-AHARPart1.pdf [https://perma.cc/J88F-RDYW]. Chronically homeless people living in families
are defined as “people experiencing homelessness in families in which the head of household
has a disability and has either been continuously homeless for a year or more or has
experienced at least four episodes of homelessness in the last three years.” Id.
48
See The State of Homelessness in America, NAT’L ALL. TO END HOMELESSNESS 3 (2015),
http://www.endhomelessness.org/library/entry/the-state-of-homelessness-in-america2015 [https://perma.cc/Q8PU-QS5M] (noting homelessness decreased by 2.3 percent from
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increase in homelessness after 2008.49 From 2008 to 2009, the homeless
population increased from 636,324 persons to 656,129.50 In contrast, a 2015
report from HUD stated that 578,424 people living in the United States
experienced homelessness on a single night in January 2014.51
Despite the small decline in the homeless since the Great Recession,
this decrease has not stymied resurging efforts by cities to criminalize the
homeless.52 Criminalization is a term used to describe tactics used by local
governments to remove the homeless from public places such as streets
and parks “by treating the performance of basic human behaviors—like
sitting down, sleeping, and bathing—as criminal activities.”53 For
example, Clearwater, Florida, makes it illegal to sit or lie down in public,
beg in public, and sleep in vehicles. 54 Similarly, Manchester, New
Hampshire made the following illegal in public parks or public places:
2013 to 2014, which took place after “a period of ongoing recovery from the Great
Recession”).
49
See HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS SURVEY: A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND
HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA’S CITIES, U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS 13 (2008),
http://www.usmayors.org/pressreleases/documents/hungerhomelessnessreport_121208.
pdf [https://perma.cc/3UCF-T4U8] (reporting on the number of cities—out of twenty-five
surveyed—that saw an increase in homelessness in 2008). Twenty-five cities participated in
this poll: Nashville, Kingston, Philadelphia, Salt Lake City, Des Moines, Chicago, Boston,
Denver, Cleveland, Los Angeles, Trenton, Santa Monica, Charlotte, Gastonia, Phoenix,
Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Louisville, Charleston, Dallas, and Kansas City. Id. at 6.
Four cities reported no change in the number of the homeless, and two cities had insufficient
data to make an adequate report. Id. at 13. However, “[o]n average, cities reported a [twelve]
percent increase in homelessness in 2008.” Id.
50
See M. WILLIAM SERMONS & PETER WITTE, STATE OF HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA: AN INDEPTH EXAMINATION OF HOMELESS COUNTS, ECONOMIC INDICATORS, DEMOGRAPHIC DRIVERS,
AND
CHANGES
AT
THE
STATE
AND
NATIONAL
LEVEL
7
(2011),
http://www.endhomelessness.org/files/3668_file_SOH_report_FINAL_LOW_RES_NOT_
embargoed.pdf [https://perma.cc/MFJ3-NJAX] (explaining there was an increase of 19,805
homeless persons from 2008 to 2009). This report also noted an increase in the chronic
homeless population. See id. at 8 (reporting the chronic homeless population increased from
111,323 persons in 2008 to 112,076 persons in 2009). Chronic homelessness means “people
who have disabilities, including serious mental illness, chronic substance use disorders, or
chronic medical issues, and who are homeless repeatedly for long periods of time.” Id.
51
See HENRY ET AL., supra note 47, at 6 (providing statistics about homelessness during
2014 as part of an initiative to end homelessness).
52
See Aaron Cantu, The Growing Criminalization of Homelessness: How Developers and
Politicians Create Urban ‘Social Hygiene’ Campaigns, ALJAZEERA (July 18, 2014),
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/7/thegrowingcriminalizationofhomelessnes
s.html [https://perma.cc/M43C-NZWW] (describing an increase in ordinances that target
the homeless).
53
Tristia Bauman et al., No Safe Place: The Criminalization of Homelessness in U.S. Cities,
NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY 16 (2014), http://www.nlchp.org/documents/
No_Safe_Place [https://perma.cc/AF3N-QKTP].
54
See id. at 8 (mentioning various prohibitions codified in the municipal code of
Clearwater, Florida).
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lying down, sleeping, sitting down, and camping.55 When the homeless
violate these ordinances, police and private security firms cleanse
downtown and urban spaces by enforcing these laws and punishing the
homeless with fines or misdemeanors.56
Sadly, these laws are gaining popularity.57 A recent study of 187 cities
across the United States concluded that city-wide camping bans have
increased sixty percent, and camping bans in particular public areas have
increased sixteen percent.58 Laws that ban begging, sitting or lying down,
55
See id. (listing City of Manchester ordinances that impact the homeless who use parks).
Cities also target the homeless by relying on property sweeps, which makes it easier for
police and sanitation workers to confiscate the belongings of homeless individuals left in
parks or public property. See Gale Holland, L.A. Is Warned of Possible Suit against Homeless
Sweeps Law, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-lnhomeless-sweep-litigation-20150812-story.html
[https://perma.cc/V4WJ-RNQW]
(describing police tactics used to take apart camps in skid row by seizing and destroying
property).
56
See Cantu, supra note 52 (stating politicians who enact these ordinances are rarely
challenged, and businesses, developers, and city officials partner with private and public
security forces to enforce these laws). Exclusionary zoning laws and community outrage are
cyclical events that are typically triggered by noteworthy, national events such as
deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill or downturns in the economy. See Moira J. Kinnally,
Note, Not in My Backyard: The Disabled’s Quest for Rights in Local Zoning Disputes under the
Fair Housing, the Rehabilitation, and the Americans with Disabilities Acts, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 581,
592 (1999) (characterizing the cyclical nature of city ordinances and community opposition
to the homeless).
57
See Marc-Tizoc Gonzalez, Hunger, Poverty, and the Criminalization of Food Sharing in the
New Gilded Age, 23 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 231, 281 (2015) (writing that
criminalizing the homeless began before the Great Recession and is likely accelerating).
Gonzalez argues that criminalization of homeless persons must be viewed within the context
of what he describes as “the New Gilded Age.” Id. at 238. Gonzalez further asserts that the
“power elite”—people whose positions allow them to command major societal organizations
and hierarchies—have shaped our current state of gentrification and shift towards political
decisions that scale back programs benefiting fringe classes and people living in poverty. Id.
at 233, 242–43. For Gonzalez, this context explains why numerous anti-food sharing laws
popped up during a time of prosperity and boom before the Great Recession. Id. at 280–81.
Gonzalez’s insight bolsters the argument that food-sharing with the homeless is a direct
response to broad, systemic forces that the homeless are unable to change on their own. See
Watson, supra note 42, at 523 (opining that the homeless rarely vote because they are more
concerned about providing for their basic needs).
According to another scholar, understanding homelessness begins with asking why the
wealthy tolerate and ignore homeless populations instead of asking questions about why
people are in poverty. See Jane B. Baron, The “No Property” Problem: Understanding Poverty
by Understanding Wealth, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1000 (2004) (crediting Kim Hopper and
other lawyers with framing the question around wealth instead of homelessness). Baron
argues that society must grapple with the “no property” category, which allows the homeless
to seek rights to panhandle and sleep outdoors but not to seek rights to housing and public
benefits. Id. at 1004–05. “[I]f you have no property, and no affirmative legal claim to have
property, what else can you seek?” Id. at 1023.
58
See BAUMAN ET AL., supra note 53, at 8 (offering the results of nation-wide survey of 187
major cities regarding ordinances that impact everyday activity of the homeless).
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loitering, and sleeping in vehicles in public have increased twenty-four
percent, fifty-three percent, thirty-three percent, and forty-three percent
respectively.59 As cities carry out the process of “Manhattanization,” the
poor are displaced in the name of development and tourism.60 Civil rights
attorneys have seen these laws proposed and passed throughout the
country.61 These ordinances are “pitting city officials against homeless
advocates.”62 Given the trends of downtown revitalization and antihomeless laws, some scholars go “so far as to predict the ‘end of public
space,’ pointing to the erosion of the public domain as an arena for
political protest . . . [due to] ‘sanitized’ public spaces that encourage the
essentially private practices of leisure and consumption of a limited
section of society.”63
Additionally, cities use permit schemes and other restrictive laws to
discourage groups from sharing food with the homeless. 64 In 2012,
Houston, Texas passed a law making it illegal to have a food service event
on public or private property without a permit.65 The law seeks to ensure

59
See id. (providing results from an assessment regarding ordinances that impact begging,
sitting or lying down, loitering, or sleeping in vehicles in cities across the United States).
60
See Elizabeth Greenspan, How to Manhattanize a City, NEW YORKER (Oct. 23, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/currency-tag/how-to-manhattanize-a-city
[https://perma.cc/E38P-QF9K] (defining the term “[m]anhattanize” and its impact on
people living in poverty by “turning a city into a playground for the wealthiest inhabitants”).
61
See Yamiche Alcindor, Cities’ Homeless Crackdown: Could it Be Compassion Fatigue?, USA
TODAY (June 10, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-0610/cities-crack-down-on-homeless/55479912/1 [https://perma.cc/QKW6-7P3M] (quoting
a civil rights lawyer’s comments on the current trend of enacting ordinances that criminalize
the homeless).
62
Id.
63
John Dixon et al., Locating Impropriety: Street Drinking, Moral Order, and the Ideological
Dilemma of Public Space, 27 POL. PSYCHOL. 187, 189–90 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
According to Dixon and the other authors, conduct is categorized as problematic because it
is “out-of-place,” which allows society to reject the homeless, among other groups, because
they bring private conduct—sleeping—to the public sphere. See id. at 190 (recognizing that
this justification impacts the homeless as well as teenagers, homosexual relationships, and
racial or ethnic minorities).
64
See SHARE NO MORE, supra note 7, at 4 (explaining that one method of criminalizing the
homeless consists of introducing new laws that restrict the ability of groups and individuals
to feed the homeless in public parks); see also Nate Vogel, The Fundraisers, the Beggars, and the
Hungry: The First Amendment Rights to Solicit Donations, to Beg for Money, and to Share Food,
15 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 537, 550 (2012) (demonstrating local governments started
banning food-sharing with the homeless in public parks as another strategy to deter the
homeless from using public parks). According to Vogel, “Similar to laws that ban begging,
laws that regulate group feeding attempt to drive the poorest members of society out of the
public’s sight.” Vogel, supra note 64.
65
See HOUSTON, TEX., MUN. CODE § 20-252 (2015) (enacting into law a $2,000 fine for
violating the city ordinance in regards to food-sharing restrictions). The relevant portion of
the ordinance reads as follows:
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that the homeless receive quality food under sanitary conditions while
simultaneously protecting private interests and the environment. 66 Even
so, homeless advocates have noticed that group feedings have decreased
since the advent of the law.67
In addition, Raleigh, North Carolina requires a permit before groups
or individuals can distribute food in public parks or on greenways. 68
Applications are submitted to the Chief of Police who denies petitions if
the proposed event will hinder or impede other regular park events or if
it will create a nuisance.69 Medford, Oregon requires a permit from the
Parks Director for groups of twenty-five or more persons who want to use
any park for any event or festival. 70 Myrtle Beach, South Carolina requires

Use of property without consent is prohibited. It shall be unlawful for
any organization or individual to sponsor or conduct a food service
event [for five or more people] on public or private property without
the advance written consent of the public or private property owner or
other individual with lawful control of the property.
Id. The ordinance defines a “food service event” as an “instance in which charitable food
services are provided to more than five individuals.” § 20-251.
66
See id. (requiring consent from both public and private property owners before
conducting a food service). In contrast, Las Vegas, Nevada spelled out an ordinance that
specifically targeted the homeless. See D. Matthew Lay, Note, Do Not Feed the Homeless: One
of the Meanest Cities for the Homeless Unconstitutionally Punishes the So-Called “Enablers,” 8 NEV.
L.J. 740, 744 (2008) (chronicling the events leading up to a lawsuit between Sacco and the
City of Las Vegas over the constitutionality of the ordinance that banned food sharing in
parks with the homeless). The enacted ordinance “[p]rohibited within any City park . . . the
providing of food or meals to the indigent for free or for a nominal fee.” Id. (quoting LAS
VEGAS, NEV., MUN. CODE § 13.36.055(a)(6) (2006)).
67
See Mary Emily O’Hara, More US Cities Are Cracking Down on Feeding the Homeless, VICE
NEWS (June 8, 2014), https://news.vice.com/article/more-us-cities-are-cracking-down-onfeeding-the-homeless [https://perma.cc/2764-BB6B] (quoting a food advocate who
explained “[a] lot of people who used to serve food [to the hungry] don’t serve anymore”).
A diverse, local coalition attempted to stop the law from passing, but they were unsuccessful;
they hope to use a ballot initiative to overturn it. Id.
68
See RALEIGH, N.C., MUN. CODE § 9-2022(b) (2015) (“No individuals or group shall serve
or distribute meals or food of any kind in or on any City park or greenway unless such
distribution is pursuant to a permit issued by the Parks, Recreation and Greenway
Director.”).
69
See § 9-2022(c) (describing the application process). The ordinance states:
The application shall be submitted to the Chief of Police and shall state
the name of the individual or organization and the name and address of
its principal officers and of its directors or other governing body and
shall also contain such other pertinent information as may be required
by the Chief of Police in order to clearly identify the organization
submitting the request and the individuals principally engaged in the
conduct of its affairs.
Id.
70
See MEDFORD, OR., MUN. CODE § 2.185(2) (2015) (explaining that the Parks Director may
issue special rules for events in parks). The ordinance states:
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groups that distribute food to the homeless in public to obtain a permit
issued by the city and proof of compliance with the Department of Health
and Environmental Control regulations.71 Manchester, New Hampshire
mandates nonprofits distributing food free of charge within city limits or
a police jurisdiction to obtain a permit from the requisite Health
Authority.72 Fort Lauderdale, Florida has also enacted laws that impact

Id.

The City Manager, or his designee, may, subject to Park and Recreation
Department rules and regulations for park use, grant a special permit to
allow the use of dedicated park lands and recreational facilities for the
purpose of conducting concerts, lectures, athletic events; show, craft and
art fairs; and other special events or uses as are considered compatible
with normal park and recreational activities.

See MYRTLE BEACH, S.C., MUN. CODE § 14-316(f)(1)–(3) (2015) (detailing the
requirements for persons or groups who want to use a park or publicly owned facility to
distribute food to others). The ordinance states:
(1) No person shall knowingly sponsor, conduct, or participate in the
distribution or service of food at a large group feeding at a park or
public facility owned or controlled by the City of Myrtle Beach
without a facility use permit properly issued by the city and
without proof of compliance with South Carolina Department of
Health and Environmental Control Regulation 61-25 for the
preparation and service of food.
(2) No person shall, in the public park, engage in organizing, serving
or distributing food to the public in a large group feeding event fail
to produce and display any required department of health and
environmental control permit for such open air food distribution,
or the required special event or facility use permit during a large
group feeding event to a law enforcement officer upon demand.
(3) Not more than one large group feeding facility use permits may be
issued to a person, or persons acting in cooperation through joint
purpose however loosely associated within a 12-month period.
Not more than four large group feeding permits shall be issued to
a legally recognized entity, such as an eleemosynary endeavor
properly registered with the Secretary of State, association, charity
or organization for large group feedings in any 12 consecutive
month period.
Id.
72
See MANCHESTER, N.H., MUN. CODE §§ 117.15, 117.17 (2015) (mandating permission
from the City before serving food outdoors). One ordinance reads, “It shall be unlawful for
any person who does not possess a valid permit issued to him by the Health Authority to
operate a food-service establishment within the city or in a police jurisdiction.” § 117.15.
Another ordinance states, “Any person desiring to operate a food-service establishment shall
make written application for a permit on a form provided by the Health Authority.” § 117.17.
A food establishment is:
Any fixed or mobile restaurant; cafeteria; coffee shop; cocktail lounge;
catering kitchen; sidewalk cafe; commissary; grille, luncheonette; shortorder cafe; sandwich shop; soda fountain; tea-room; drive-in; nightclub;
roadside stand; industrial feeding establishment; private, public, or
nonprofit organization or institution serving the public; or similar place
71
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social service agencies using public property.73 Santa Monica, California
incorporated its food-sharing ordinance with its special events
ordinance.74 Last, Columbia, South Carolina enacted laws that impact
food sharing in public parks.75 Because these ordinances regulate conduct,
in which food or drink is prepared for sale for food service on the
premises or elsewhere; and any other eating or drinking establishment
where food is served or provided for the public with or without charge.
§ 117.01.
See FT. LAUDERDALE, FLA. MUN. CODE § 47-18.31(A) (2015) (enacting these laws to
prevent social service agencies that have “serious objectionable characteristics, and that may
result in adverse secondary effects on adjacent properties”). The ordinance also states:
Outdoor food distribution center. Any location or site temporarily used to
furnish meals to members of the public without cost or at a very low
cost as a social service as defined herein and is generally providing food
distribution services exterior to a building or structure or without
permanent facilities on a property.
§ 47-18.31(B)(4). The code goes on to state:
Outdoor food distribution center (OFDC). Shall be subject to the following:
ii. Shall not be closer than five hundred (500) feet from another food
distribution center or outdoor food distribution center.
iii. Shall not be any closer than five hundred (500) feet from a residential
property . . . .
iv. Shall provide restroom facilities, portable toilets or other similar
facilities for persons preparing and serving food as well as for the
persons being served food.
v. Shall provide equipment . . . for the lawful disposal of waste and
wastewater at the location.
vii. Shall provide written consent from the property owner to conduct
that activity on the property
xi. Shall provide service of food within four (4) hours of preparation.
xii. Where non-prepackaged food is served, a convenient hand washing
facility for persons preparing and serving the food.
§§ 47-18.31(C)(2)(c)(ii)–(v), (vii), (xi)–(xii).
74
See SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 4.68.040(b) (2015) (requiring a permit for any
activity that may interfere with public property). The code states:
Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter or other applicable law,
rule or regulation or any permit or license issued hereunder or pursuant
to the terms of a permit, lease, or contract which has been specifically
authorized by the City Council, a community event permit shall be
required to be obtained from the Community Event Committee for the
following activities . . . [a]ny activity or event on City owned,
controlled, or maintained property not subject to the requirements of
subsection (a) of this Section, involving one hundred fifty or more
persons, or involving seventy-five or more persons on the Santa Monica
Third Street Promenade.
Id. Permits are subject to denial for: making a misleading or fraudulent statement, failing to
include all necessary information, failing to satisfy all requirements, leaving out a payment,
damaging city property, failing to show proof of insurance or sign an indemnification paper
before using public property. § 4.68.070(a)–(e).
75
See COLUMBIA, S.C., MUN. CODE § 15-2(a) (2015) (enacting an ordinance that impacts
food-sharing). The ordinance reads:
73
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the next Part offers information about the First Amendment and symbolic
speech.76
B. The First Amendment and Symbolic Speech
Before receiving protection under the First Amendment, distributing
food to the homeless must qualify as symbolic speech.77 However, not
every communicative act receives protection because courts must
determine whether the conduct is inherently expressive. 78 Thus, Part
II.B.1 explains the development of inherently expressive conduct, and Part
II.B.2 explores the latitude city governments have in regulating expressive
conduct.79
1.

Inherently Expressive Conduct

Speech is not limited to verbal or written communication, and courts
throughout history have granted First Amendment protection to
expressive conduct that qualifies as “symbolic speech.”80 For example, in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Supreme
Court considered whether wearing black armbands in public schools
should qualify as symbolic speech. 81 Students decided to wear black

Permit required; conditions.
Any person, group, association or
organization desiring to use any park or recreational facility of the City
of Columbia for a group of 25 individuals or more or to conduct an
activity or event for which it could be reasonably assumed that 25 or
more persons might gather at a park or recreational facility to participate
in or witness such activity or event or a festival.
Id. The Director of the Parks Department may deny permits when protecting, “the public
health, safety, security, peace, order, welfare, and convenience.” Id.
76
See infra Part II.B (explaining First Amendment jurisprudence related to symbolic
speech).
77
See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 39 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining First
Amendment application).
78
See infra Part II.B.1 (stating the development of expressive conduct jurisprudence).
79
See infra Parts II.B.1–2 (exploring inherently expressive conduct and the government’s
ability to regulate conduct in public spaces).
80
See FARBER, supra note 77, at 39 (explaining when speech is symbolic); see also ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1117 (5th ed. 2015) (noting
that people often communicate through symbols).
81
See 393 U.S. 503, 504–05 (1969) (considering whether a school policy banning black arms
bands violated the First Amendment). Justice Marshall Harlan in his dissent would have
affirmed the lower court’s decision because the petitioner failed to show that the school did
not have a legitimate concern such as “prohibit[ing] the expression of an unpopular point of
view, while permitting expression of the dominant view.” See id. at 526 (arguing that in
situations described in Tinker, petitioners must carry the burden of proof that a school does
not have a legitimate concern).
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armbands to protest the Vietnam War.82 Subsequently, school officials
suspended students who refused to remove the armbands. 83 The Court
held that enforcing the ban through suspension denied students their
constitutional right to express their opinion.84
To determine whether conduct qualifies as symbolic speech, the
Supreme Court provided an important roadmap in Spence v. Washington.85
The Court stated that symbolic speech must satisfy the following test: (1)
the speaker must have “an intent to convey a particularized message,” and
(2) given “the surrounding circumstance,” there is a “likelihood . . . that
the message would be understood by those who viewed it.” 86
Subsequently, the Court formed a more rigorous analysis.87 In Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic Institutional Rights, Inc., the Court discussed whether
several law schools’ messages of nondiscrimination were threatened

See id. at 504 (characterizing the reason for wearing armbands in public).
See id. (describing the principals’ meeting on December 14, 1965, that discussed how to
address the issue of students wearing black armbands at school).
84
See id. at 516 (“[W]earing . . . armbands is ‘symbolic speech’ which is ‘akin to “pure
speech”’ and therefore protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”); see also City of
Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (concluding that nude erotic dancing is expressive
conduct); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (holding that burning a flag was
expressive conduct); but see Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547
U.S. 47, 66 (2006) (reasoning that the law schools’ message of nondiscrimination against
homosexuals by banning military recruiters from recruiting on campuses was not inherently
expressive because it relied on explanatory speech); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484
(1993) (“[P]hysical assault is not by any stretch of the imagination expressive conduct
protected by the First Amendment.”).
85
See 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (determining whether hanging a flag upside down with
an affixed peace symbol qualified as symbolic speech). The violation in Spence took place
under the following statute:
No person shall, in any manner, for exhibition or display: (1) Place or
cause to be placed any word, figure, mark, picture, design, drawing or
advertisement of any nature upon any flag, standard, color, ensign or
shield of the United States or of this state . . . or (2) Expose to public view
any such flag, standard, color, ensign or shield upon which shall have
been printed, painted or otherwise produced, or to which shall have
been attached, appended, affixed or annexed any such word, figure,
mark, picture, design, drawing or advertisement.
Id. at 407. At the trial court level, defendant was charged seventy-five dollars, sentenced to
ten days in jail, and was suspended from school. See id. at 408 (describing the trial court’s
ruling). The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the decision, but the Washington
Supreme Court “reversed and reinstated the conviction.” Id.
86
Id. at 410–11.
87
See David Mangone, Note, Speech at a Crossroads: The Intersection of Symbolic Speech,
Government Speech, and the State License Plate, 8 FED. CTS. L. REV. 97, 118 (2014) (stating in
order for symbolic speech to receive protection, “there must not only be an intent to convey
a particularized message, but there must also be an overwhelmingly apparent message and
a great likelihood that someone would understand the message”).
82
83
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when military recruiters gained access to their campuses. 88 The law
schools disagreed with the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy
regarding homosexuals in the military. 89 The Court held that denying
access to military recruiters was not inherently expressive because the
expressive component was not created by conduct itself, but “by the
speech that accompanie[d] it.”90 Thus, conduct must “convey a
particularized message without the aid of explanatory speech.” 91
Conduct that relies on symbols that “have acquired a well-understood
social meaning in contemporary society” can receive First Amendment
protection.92 For example, the Court protected hanging a flag with an
affixed peace symbol outside a window in response to the United States’
88
See 547 U.S. 47, 52 (2006) (noting that Forum for Academic Institutional Rights (“FAIR”)
challenged an amendment that denied funding to schools preventing military recruiters
from accessing their campuses).
89
See id. (discussing FAIR’s new policies in response to the military’s discrimination
against homosexuals). This law precluded openly gay and lesbian Americans from military
service. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Obama Ends ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 22,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/us/23military.html [https://perma.cc/
E9PQ-JE5D] (characterizing the impact of the military’s law). President Obama signed the
Don’t Ask Don’t Tell Repeal Act in 2010, which brought an end to the military’s seventeenyear-old law. See CNN Wire Staff, Obama Signs Repeal of ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Policy, CNN
(Dec.
27,
2010),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/12/22/dadt.repeal/
[https://perma.cc/9RYU-24WN] (reporting on how President Obama helped bring an end
to “the long political struggle over the military’s controversial ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy”).
90
Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66.
91
Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The First Amendment Structure for Speakers and Speech, 44
SETON HALL L. REV. 395, 441 (2014). Rhodes states that “only those forms of predominantly
communicative conduct that the founders considered expressive (such as parades,
instrumental music, and art) are assumed to be covered by the First Amendment.” Id. at 440.
Conduct is inherently expressive “[w]hen the relevant form of conduct is of more recent
origin, or involves an activity (such as burning) that in most instances is not expressive . . . .”
Id. at 440–41. Therefore, the “Court ‘defines in’ First Amendment coverage for conduct based
on either its traditional or inherent expressiveness.” Id. at 441. For example, the Court in
Rumsfeld did not find inherently expressive conduct “because no tradition exists of viewing
a refusal to allow access as equivalent to expression, and such an action is not inherently
expressive . . . .” Id. at 444. According to Rhodes:
The use of the contrary presumption for nonlinguistic acts also appears
preferable due to the dangers from overincluding conduct as covered
expression.
Although most activities contain some “kernel of
expression,” not every action can implicate the First Amendment, at
least not without either significantly diluting First Amendment
protections or prohibiting government regulation of a wide swath of
activities. As a result, the Court has been cautious in extending First
Amendment coverage to nonlinguistic conduct, especially in the
absence of a historical expressive pedigree.
Id. at 442.
92
Rhodes, supra note 91, at 437. This is true for both new symbols and conduct that is not
predominately expressive. See id. (stating well-understood methods apply to symbols of
recent origin).
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Cambodian invasion and the Kent State tragedy.93 The speaker intended
to communicate that “America stood for peace.”94 The Court reasoned
that the poignant timing of his act—given the surrounding
circumstances—allowed observers to understand the message. 95
Only two circuit courts have analyzed food sharing as inherently
expressive conduct.96 The Eleventh Circuit assumed, without deciding,
that distributing food to the homeless was inherently expressive. 97 The
Ninth Circuit stated that food sharing could qualify as expressive conduct
under an as-applied challenge.98 However, neither appeared to seriously
question food-distribution as expressive conduct. 99 Even so, courts are
split on the correct analysis for restrictions on distributing food to the
homeless in public parks.100 The Ninth Circuit used a time, place, and
manner analysis, while the Eleventh Circuit relied on the O’Brien test.101
93
See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (describing the expressive conduct
used by the appellant).
94
Id. at 409.
95
See id. at 410 (claiming observers would easily understand the message conveyed by the
speaker’s conduct). The Court used the Speech model for its First Amendment analysis,
which evaluates the various aspects of the speech and the surrounding circumstances to
decide if speech is protected. See Luke Meier, A Broad Attack on Overbreadth, 40 VAL. U. L.
REV. 113, 120 (2005) (contrasting the Statutory model with the Speech model for free speech
analyses). In contrast, the Statutory model considers whether a particular statute impacting
protected expression is constitutional. Id.
96
See First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 638 F.3d 756, 758 (11th Cir. 2011)
(assuming without deciding that feeding the homeless in a park is expressive conduct); see
also Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1032 (9th Cir.
2006) (explaining that Food Not Bombs did not argue that food-sharing is expressive
conduct, but it could qualify as expressive “in an as-applied challenge, should one be
brought.”).
97
See First Vagabonds Church of God, 638 F.3d at 761 (concluding feeding the homeless in a
public park to communicate a message is expressive conduct).
98
See Santa Monica Food Not Bombs, 450 F.3d at 1032 (stating that Food Not Bombs failed
to argue that food-sharing is expressive conduct, but the court stated that it could qualify as
expressive “in an as-applied challenge, should one be brought”).
99
See id. at 1032 (finding it unnecessary to determine whether the conduct was
expressive); First Vagabonds Church of God, 638 F.3d at 761 (presuming that food-sharing in a
public park is expressive conduct).
100
See Gonzalez, supra note 57, at 234 (identifying a circuit split between the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuit regarding the constitutionality of permit schemes that impact food-sharing
in public parks).
101
See id. at 274 (stating the Eleventh Circuit upheld an ordinance using O’Brien that
restricted activities of homeless advocates in parks, and the Ninth Circuit found a municipal
events ordinance unconstitutional using a time, place, and manner analysis). Gonzalez
argues courts should adopt the Ninth Circuit’s approach because:
[It] agrees with the Sixth Circuit that narrow tailoring requires a “close
relationship” between the ordinance and the size of the assembly to be
regulated, in order to justify a governmental entity’s time, place, or
manner restriction beyond “ordinary” use of such publicly owned
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The implications of selecting either choice will be discussed in the
following Part.102
2.

Government Regulations of Inherently Expressive Conduct

Even when conduct receives protection under the First Amendment,
“it is [not] immune from government regulation.”103 City governments
may place restrictions on conduct that incidentally impacts speech if it has
an important interest that does not aim to suppress the speech itself. 104 For
example, Fort Lauderdale placed several restrictions on outdoor food
sharing.105 These restrictions were primarily aimed at conduct and only
incidentally impacted Mr. Abbott’s speech.106 Using regulations that
incidentally impact speech is one approach cities take throughout the
United States.107
The Supreme Court stated in United States v. O’Brien that when
conduct combines both speech and non-speech elements, “a sufficiently
important governmental interest . . . can justify incidental limitations on
First Amendment freedoms.”108 In O’Brien, the defendant publicly burned
property. In the Eleventh Circuit . . . cities may regulate groups as small
as twenty-five people . . . and cities may limit permits to any particular
person, group, or organization to no more than two permits per
individual, group, or organization, per park, within a twelve-month
period.
Id. at 277.
See infra Part II.C.2 (portraying government regulations on inherently expressive
conduct).
103
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 1119.
104
See id. (articulating when the government can regulate conduct when it does not directly
suppress the message).
105
See FT. LAUDERDALE, FLA. MUN. CODE § 47-18.31(C)(2)(c)(i)–(xiii) (2015) (listing
regulations for Outdoor Food Distribution Centers that pertain to sanitation, location,
methods, and fines).
106
See id. (demanding groups follow certain requirements before getting a permit).
107
See SHARE NO MORE, supra note 7, at 4 (disclosing various tactics cities use to impact
food sharing such as placing restrictions on how groups and individuals can use public
property or mandating compliance with local food-safety laws). Even though these laws are
cumbersome, the National Coalition for the Homeless explained that community actions
against the homeless, which are fueled by Not in My Back Yard (“NIMBY”) principles, are
the most troublesome because local businesses and home-owner coalitions can place
immense pressure on city governments to relocate feeding programs and to enact these laws.
See id. (arguing a major impetus for some of these laws results from businesses and
individuals that complain because they do not want to attract the homeless to their
communities or places of business).
108
391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). Vogel argues homeless advocates should try to argue that
regulations impacting food distribution to the homeless in public parks are not incidental
restraints on speech. See Vogel, supra note 64, at 561 (explaining advocates will be more
successful under the public forum doctrine). Vogel explains convincing the court to use the
public forum doctrine over the O’Brien test is paramount for food advocates because the
102
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his draft card at a courthouse in protest of the Selective Service. 109
According to the Court, the government can regulate conduct if: (1) “[the
regulation] is within the constitutional power of the government;” (2)
“[the regulation] furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest;” (3) “the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression;” and (4) “the incidental restriction . . . is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.”110
The Supreme Court clarified the last prong of the O’Brien test in Ward
v. Rock Against Racism.111 The Court explained governments are not
required to draft regulations that are the “least restrictive or least intrusive
means of [regulating].”112 Instead, intermediate scrutiny makes sure the
O’Brien test is more deferential. See id. (describing trial tactics for homeless advocates). Thus,
Vogel explains the following for homeless advocates:
Laws that only require permits for all food sharing, but do not limit the
number of permits a group can get are difficult to frame as more than
“incidental” restraints on expression. However, laws that put absolute
limits on the number of permits an organization can get in a year, or
laws that explicitly ban sharing food with the indigent should be seen
as targeted at the expression of groups like Food Not Bombs. These laws
are not incidental restraints that require them to conform to certain
health standards. They are laws that target their particular kind of
political activity that requires sharing food.
Id. at 561–62.
109
See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 370 (describing O’Brien’s testimony to the jury about his
conduct).
110
Id. at 377. This test is essentially identical to intermediate scrutiny. CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 80, at 1119. Despite the requirement of intermediate scrutiny under O’Brien, these
regulations receive deferential treatment. See FARBER, supra note 77, at 25 (opining that other
than statutes that close a traditional form of communication, the Court rarely overturns a
content-neutral regulation).
111
See FARBER, supra note 77, at 25 (explaining Ward’s new test borrowed the first two
prongs from Warren’s opinion and the last prong from Harlan’s concurrence). Farber
explains:
Perhaps the most typical aspect of the decisions in O’Brien and Ward is
that they uphold the government regulation. Except for statutes that
entirely foreclose a traditional channel of communication such as lawn
signs, the Court rarely invalidates a regulation once it has found it to be
content neutral. Even the presumption against closing a channel of
communication is unreliable: the Court had little difficulty in
upholding a ban on attaching posters to utility poles. Thus, the outcome
of a given case often turns almost completely on whether the regulation
is characterized as content based.
Id.
112
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989). According to Chemerinsky:
In appraising Ward, there are two important questions, one normative
and one descriptive. Normatively the issue is whether least restrictive
alternative analysis should be used in evaluating government
regulation of speech in public forums because of the importance of the
right to use government property for speech. Descriptively the question
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law is “not substantially broader than necessary to achieve [the
government’s] interest.”113 Despite this relaxed standard, the Court stated
in 2014 that governments cannot regulate conduct in a way that
substantially burdens speech without advancing its goals.114
Within the context of food distribution in public parks, the Eleventh
Circuit relied on the O’Brien test to uphold the City of Orlando’s
ordinance.115 In Orlando, two groups fed the homeless weekly in Lake
Eola Park.116 After complaints about the homeless passing through
neighborhoods after the feedings, the city enacted a permit requirement
for group feedings in parks. 117 The court opined that the ordinance
satisfied the O’Brien test because the City could enact the ordinance, the
City had a substantial interest, the ordinance did not suppress speech, and
the ordinance only incidentally impacted speech.118

is whether the distinction makes sense between a requirement for
narrow tailoring and a demand for the least restrictive alternative.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 1199.
113
See Ward, 491 U.S. at 783 (describing when a regulation that supports a legitimate
government interest is narrowly tailored). In other words, courts will not invalidate a law
just because a less-restrictive alternative can meet the government’s interests. Id. at 800.
114
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2535 (2014) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)). Nonetheless, courts have used O’Brien to uphold “both
anti-begging laws and anti-food sharing laws.” Vogel, supra note 64, at 561.
115
See First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 638 F.3d 756, 762 (11th Cir. 2011)
(reversing the district court because the ordinance was a “valid regulation of expressive
conduct that satisfies all four requirements of O’Brien”).
116
See id. at 758 (explaining the facts leading up to the lawsuit).
117
See id. at 759 (pointing out the enacted ordinances that required a permit and only
allowed a limited number of permits that people could obtain for any park within a year).
118
See id. at 762 (explaining how the ordinance complies with the four factors of O’Brien).
However, Pappas argues that the Eleventh Circuit misused the constitutional-fact doctrine
in deciding this case. See Fay O. Pappas, Comment, Wrong Means to an Unjust End? The
Eleventh Circuit’s Decision in First Vagabonds Church of God, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1125, 1135 (2012)
(arguing that misusing this doctrine will weaken the right to free speech). According to
Pappas, the Eleventh Circuit misapplied the constitutional fact doctrine when overturning
the district court:
The district court in the instant case found that the facially contentneutral regulation, which placed a burden on free speech, failed to serve
a single interest asserted by the City. The Eleventh Circuit’s
contradictory finding—that the Ordinance’s purported interest in
ameliorating overuse of the park system was indeed substantial—was
totally outcome-determinative; the Court turned the question of overuse
into an issue of constitutional fact subject to de novo review. It
thereafter used the constitutional-fact doctrine to re-decide a factual
issue upon which the case turns.
Id. at 1134–35.
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The Ninth Circuit also addressed a food-sharing ordinance in Santa
Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica.119 The City of Santa Monica
enacted an ordinance that required permits for community events of 150
people or more in public parks, sidewalks, or streets.120 Several groups
challenged the ordinance, and the court held that it passed constitutional
muster, except for the advertising provision. 121 The court concluded the
ordinance was a valid time, place, and manner restriction on public forum
speech.122
Time, place, and manner restrictions prevent speakers from
disrupting public property.123 These restrictions are valid if they are
content-neutral, serve a significant governmental interest, and provide
“alternative channels for communication of the information.” 124
C. Prior Restraint and Licensing Schemes
A permit scheme is another method governments use to regulate
speech.125 Before engaging in speech, groups or individuals must obtain
a license or permit, which creates the danger of preventing speech from
occurring because permits are contingent upon the approval of

119
See 450 F.3d 1022, 1042 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding part of Santa Monica’s community event
ordinance was not narrowly tailored).
120
See id. at 1027 (listing the permit requirements enacted by the city to manage its public
parks).
121
See id. at 1052–53 (explaining the court’s conclusion regarding Santa Monica’s
ordinance).
122
See id. at 1036–37 (asserting Santa Monica’s ordinance was similar to the ordinance in
Thomas v. Chicago Park District because it adjusted the rights of citizens to preserve free speech
instead of denying speech).
123
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 1194 (noting why governments rely on time, place,
and manner restrictions to regulate public space).
124
Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981). This test is
essentially identical to the O’Brien test. See James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech: A
Message from Mind to Mind, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 31 (2008) (asserting that O’Brien and the time,
place, and manner analysis both receive intermediate scrutiny and carefully balance
competing interests). When comparing the O’Brien test to the time, place, and manner
analysis used in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, McGoldrick explained that
Clark used the word ‘significant’ instead of the synonymous alternative ‘important or
substantial’ that was used in O’Brien. Id. at 29–30. Even though the Clark test looked to
alternative channels for communication, which O’Brien does not use, it is not inconsistent
with O’Brien. Id. at 30 n.129. According to another scholar, the Court decided not to enforce
the “ample alternative channels of communication” element, which is why it “never upholds
free speech claims.” Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny
in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 792 (2007).
125
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 1011 (detailing the reasons for enacting permit
schemes even though they risk functioning as a prior restraint).
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governmental officials.126 Thus, cities carry a heavy burden because prior
restraints have a presumption against their validity. 127 Even so,
governments view permit schemes as a necessary means to order and
safety within the public domain. 128
Permit schemes must serve important government interests and meet
several procedural limitations.129 The Supreme Court has held that permit
schemes must incorporate clear review standards, prompt response times,
and judicial access to review denials. 130 Furthermore, opportunities for
spontaneous speech must be protected.131 For example, a permit scheme
must apply to large groups because regulating small groups precludes

126
See Baby Tam & Co. v. City of Las Vegas, 154 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A prior
restraint exists when the enjoyment of protected expression is contingent upon the approval
of government officials.”); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 1196 (articulating the
nature of permit schemes and their tendency to preclude speech from occurring); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (asserting to “the extent of the constitutional protection,
it has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the guaranty
to prevent previous restraints upon publication”).
127
See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558–59 (1975) (stating there is a heavy
presumption against a prior restraint’s constitutional validity). Content-based restrictions
receive strict scrutiny while intermediate scrutiny applies to content-neutral laws. Edward
L. Carter & Brad Clark, Death of Procedural Safeguards: Prior Restraint, Due Process, and the
Elusive First Amendment Value of Content Neutrality, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 225, 233-34 (2006).
The government must show a compelling government interest to satisfy strict scrutiny and
a substantial interest for intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 233-34.
128
See Nathan W. Kellum, Permit Schemes: Under Current Jurisprudence, What Permits Are
Permitted?, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 381, 389 (2008) (pointing out the proposed goal of permit
schemes by government officials). Prior restraint jurisprudence was adopted from “English
common law[,] [which] expressly condemned the concept of pre-emptive restrictions on
speech, particularly within the context of publications.” Id. at 386. “Being keenly aware of
this concern, courts in the United States have had a ‘historic antipathy toward prior
restraints.’” Id. Permits became especially popular during the 1880s when the Salvation
Army actively engaged communities by hosting large parades and gatherings. Id. at 387.
City police targeted the Salvation army in some cities, while others only allowed silent
marches on Sundays. See RICHARD COLLIER, THE GENERAL NEXT TO GOD: THE STORY OF
WILLIAM BOOTH AND THE SALVATION ARMY 167 (1965) (portraying efforts to stifle the
Salvation Army).
129
See Kellum, supra note 128, at 405 (explaining the procedural safeguards and
constitutional protections outlined by the Supreme Court for prior restraints).
130
See id. at 414, 417 (portraying current jurisprudence regarding permits and speech
restrictions). Additionally, petitioners are entitled to prompt judicial review for denied
permits. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 1011–14 (noting the requirements of permit
schemes under Supreme Court jurisprudence). Furthermore, an appropriate fee, reasonable
notice, and anonymity are important requirements. See Kellum, supra note 128, at 408–14
(listing additional constitutional requirements). These additional requirements are beyond
the scope of this Note.
131
See Kellum, supra note 128, at 410 (opining the Court has protected spontaneous speech,
so cities must protect it when regulating through permit schemes).
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spontaneous speech.132 Additionally, permit schemes must not give
unfettered discretion to government officials. 133 Last, permits must
stipulate a prompt response time for both the agency and judicial
review.134

132
See, e.g., Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc’y of N. Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
167 (2002) (finding an ordinance unconstitutional because it precluded spontaneous speech);
Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (“[I]n order to regulate
competing uses of public forums, [governments] may impose a permit requirement on those
wishing to hold a march, parade, or rally”); see also Cox. v. City of Charleston, 416 F.3d 281,
285 (4th Cir. 2005) (regulating groups as small as two or three is unconstitutional); Grossman
v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1207–08 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding an ordinance that applied
to individuals was invalid); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Turner, 893 F.2d 1387, 1392
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding an ordinance impacting groups as small as two people was
unconstitutional).
133
See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 772 (1988) (holding “those
portions of the Lakewood ordinance giving the mayor unfettered discretion to deny a permit
application and unbounded authority to condition the permit on any additional terms he
deems ‘necessary and reasonable,’ to be unconstitutional”); Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150–51 (1969) (articulating unbridled discretion in one official to
approve or disapprove a permit is unconstitutional); see also Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975) (“[T]he Court has felt obliged to condemn systems in which the
exercise of such authority was not bounded by precise and clear standards.”); Kunz v. New
York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951) (emphasizing an administrative official must have review
standards). Relying on objective review standards is a good way to overcome discretion that
carries a presumption of unconstitutionality. See Kellum, supra note 128, at 415 (asserting
permit schemes must have “well-defined and sufficiently narrow guidelines” to pass
constitutional muster).
134
See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58–59 (1965) (“[T]he exhibitor must be assured,
by statute or authoritative judicial construction, that the censor will, within a specified brief
period, either issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film . . . .”). However, a
more recent Supreme Court case stated that the prompt response time is not a mandatory
component. See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322, 325 (2002) (holding that a
“content-neutral permit scheme regulating speech in a public forum [has never been
required to] adhere to the procedural requirements set forth in Freedman,” which required a
prompt determination by the government and an opportunity for prompt judicial review);
but see Kellum, supra note 128, at 422 (interpreting Thomas to mean that some procedural
safeguards are not required undercuts “the long-standing constitutional protections against
unfettered discretion”). According to Kellum:
Just like the Court condemns vague or non-existent standards for
awarding a permit in the first place, and just like the Court condemns
vague or non-existent standards for imposing a fee for a permit, the
Court most assuredly condemns vague or non-existent standards for
determining when to decide about a permit.
Kellum, supra note 128, at 422.
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III. ANALYSIS
Current laws that criminalize the homeless are part of an ongoing
narrative of mistreatment and exploitation. 135 Even when the homeless
populations served a vital role in developing cities’ infrastructure, societal
laws and policies negatively targeted them when their presence was
inconvenient.136 Enacting laws that affect food distribution in public parks
is another example of this perennial problem. 137
Utilizing First
Amendment freedoms to ensure cities are enacting constitutional
ordinances is the best path to protect the rights of the homeless and groups
engaged in advocacy.138 However, the First Amendment does not apply
to all types of conduct.139 Thus, Part III.A argues that feeding the homeless
in public parks is a form of symbolic speech that must receive First
Amendment protection.140 Next, Part III.B acknowledges that cities have
the ability to place incidental burdens on the speech of food advocates
while regulating their conduct, but argues that Fort Lauderdale’s
ordinance does not pass constitutional muster. 141 Last, Part III.C asserts
that ordinances serving as prior restraints fail to incorporate necessary

135
See supra Part II.A.1 (characterizing the history of homelessness in the United States and
the laws cities have enacted in response to homelessness).
136
See supra Part II.A.1 (describing laws that negatively impacted the homeless despite
their contribution to the industrial movement of the nineteenth century). Interestingly, many
cities did provide housing for the homeless. See OCOBOCK, supra note 31, at 20 (discussing
the number of transients housed in cities such as San Francisco and Chicago by World War
I to support the demand for cheap labor). It was not uncommon for local police departments
to offer housing in prisons for these workers. Cf. ROSSI, supra note 22, at 19 (describing New
York City’s police station that lodged 150,000 transients annually). “[A]nyone could
approach a New York City police station and be given lodging for the night without being
arrested and booked for any offense. . . . making it the largest lodging supplier in the city.”
Id.
Subsequently, the Great Depression forced cities like New York to provide even more
housing for the homeless. See DOROTHY LAAGER MILLER, NEW YORK CITY IN THE GREAT
DEPRESSION: SHELTERING THE HOMELESS 11 (2009) (stating that high unemployment during
the 1920s and 1930s made it necessary for New York City “to provide more commodious
quarters for the homeless”). Accordingly, “the New York City Department of Welfare
provided two annexes to the original main lodging house . . . [which was] proper for men,
women, and children . . . .” Id.
137
See supra Part II.A.1 (portraying efforts to criminalize the homeless throughout history).
138
See infra Part IV (arguing the First Amendment protects speech rights of homeless
advocates).
139
See supra Parts II.B–C (recognizing governments may regulate conduct that is not
inherently expressive and channel speech using time, place, and manner restrictions).
140
See infra Part III.A (asserting that feeding the homeless in public parks is inherently
expressive conduct that must receive First Amendment protections).
141
See infra Part III.B (contending Fort Lauderdale’s food-sharing ordinance is
unconstitutional under the O’Brien test).
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safeguards mandated by the Supreme Court, which infringes upon the
rights of homeless advocates.142
A. Food Distribution in Public Parks Is Protected Symbolic Speech
Groups that distribute food to the homeless in public parks intend to
convey a particular public message.143 Public parks are a forum that have
been traditionally used as a platform for communicating ideas between
citizens to discuss public ideas and concerns. 144 Many activists and
protestors use public space to advance their claims and rights; it is a place
where political activity flows and where movements may challenge
pertinent issues about democracy and citizenship.145 Furthermore,
organized conduct in a specific geographical space is a means to convey a
public message.146 For example, Food Not Bombs is a well-known group
that feeds the homeless throughout the country, and it relies on highly
visible locations such as parks to communicate its messages about the
right to food.147 Because groups like Food Not Bombs organize gatherings
142
See infra Part III.C (claiming cities throughout the United States that use permit schemes
to deter groups from feeding the homeless are unconstitutional because they lack requisite
safeguards).
143
See Vogel, supra note 64, at 560 (explaining homeless advocates such as Food Not Bombs
use expressive conduct and explanatory speech to make political statements).
144
See Part II (describing the role of parks in the public sphere as a place for public
assembly and discussion); see also Hague v. Cmty. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)
(describing parks as a place for public gathering and discourse).
145
See MITCHELL, supra note 45, at 134 (observing activists use public property to advocate
for issues and change in their communities).
146
See Rhodes, supra note 91, at 438 (stating case law demonstrates that organized
gathering in a particular, confined place can be just as expressive as a parade, march, or other
movement). According to Rhodes:
First Amendment coverage, then, is not limited to historical forms of
predominantly expressive conduct, but also includes analogous
contemporary forms of expressive conduct or modern symbolism
conveying a particularized message that is likely to be understood by
observers. As with the exceptions to presumptive constitutional
coverage for linguistic communications highlighted previously,
contemporary perspectives regarding the relative utility of the
communicative thought conveyed thereby supplement historical
expressive traditions.
These oft-considered distinct inquiries—
determining when words are not covered by the First Amendment and
when expressive conduct is—thus share common underpinnings.
Id. at 438–39.
147
See
FAQ,
FOODNOTBOMBS.NET,
http://foodnotbombs.net/new_site/faq.php
[https://perma.cc/V2K3-7655] (describing the mission and purpose for engaging in public
protests in parks). Food Not Bombs had its first food-sharing event in 1981 when a group of
activists set up a soup kitchen outside the Federal Reserve Bank to protest its policies. See id.
(describing the advent of Food Not Bombs). The night before the protest, they were worried
about having too much soup, so they invited the homeless from a local shelter to join them,
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in specific geographical spaces to reach the public eye, they intend to
convey a message.148
Critics will argue that intent alone does not make food distribution
inherently expressive, and the Court has not classified all expressive
Furthermore, labeling food distribution as
conduct as speech.149
inherently expressive conduct merely misidentifies speech for a
philanthropic gesture in a convenient location, and the message is not
generally understood by viewers. 150 Moreover, food sharing is not a
traditional form of expression recognized by the Court because it is a
contemporary form of advocacy for the homeless.151
However, food sharing must be viewed within the historical and
current societal context of criminalization to understand its potential
communicative value.152 The historical perception and treatment of the
homeless by cities and citizens alike demonstrates that the homeless have
never integrated into mainstream society. 153 Although they contributed
to the sprawl and development of cities, they lived in shantytowns
associated with urban blight. 154 They have wrongly been seen as a
problem that should be cleaned up.155 The resurging anti-homeless laws

which “[t]o [their] surprise, nearly [seventy] people arrived.” Id. Business people passing
by the protest stopped as well to eat food with the homeless and discuss investment policies.
Id.
148
See supra Part II.B.1 (stating symbolic speech must intend to convey a particularized
message to receive First Amendment protection).
149
See supra Part II.B.1 (describing the role of intent when approaching a First Amendment
issue and articulating that the Court does not grant all expressive conduct First Amendment
protection).
150
See supra Part II.B.1 (noting the requirements that must be satisfied before the Court
grants First Amendment protections to expressive conduct).
151
See Timeline—The First 35 Years of Food Not Bombs, FOODNOTBOMBS.NET,
http://foodnotbombs.net/new_site/timeline.php [https://perma.cc/N96A-BEQB] (stating
Food Not Bombs used food-sharing in a park on March 26, 1981, to protest a bank and the
nuclear industry); see also Couch, supra note 4 (stating Arnold Abbott has served the homeless
for two decades).
152
See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (portraying how mere bizarre
behavior of hanging a flag outside a window could convey a message given the societal
context).
153
See supra Part II.A.1 (explaining the negative perceptions of the homeless throughout
history and their inability to gain acceptance by the mainstream society).
154
See supra Part II.A.1 (describing the living conditions of the homeless).
155
See supra Parts II.A.1–2 (noting the destruction of shanty towns and utilization of police
to criminalize the homeless so they leave certain areas). These laws not only saddle the
homeless with a criminal history, but they impact the taxpayers as well because tax money
spent on law enforcement and emergency health care cost three times as much as giving the
homeless shelter and supportive services. See Scott Keyes, Criminalizing Homelessness Can
Now Cost Cities Federal Money, THINKPROGRESS (Sep. 22, 2015), http://thinkprogress.org/
economy/2015/09/22/3704274/hud-homelessness-criminalization-funding/

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol51/iss3/6

Detweiler: Breaking Bread and the Law: Criminalizing Homelessness and First

2017]

Criminalizing Homelessness

723

spreading across the nation carry the same goal of cleansing new forms of
urban blight and public nuisances.156 Thus, society’s harsh attitude
towards the homeless creates a vivid context that allows food sharing to
imbue a particular message to the lawmakers, citizens, and businesses
who desire these harsh laws.157
Under the test outlined in Spence v. Washington, the ostensibly benign
conduct of feeding people moves beyond a mere picnic or philanthropic
gesture; it makes a vivid public statement that the homeless are legitimate
members of society and have a right to public space.158 When the interests
of the homeless get pushed aside, and people are prevented from publicly
advocating for them, society does not view the homeless as legitimate
members of their community.159 In this sense, using public space to
advocate for their rights is essential.160 Even if onlookers fail to grasp this
particular message, watching the homeless line up and wait for food
causes observers to contemplate the plight of the homeless. 161 Critics will
argue that groups can advocate for the homeless without feeding the
homeless or including them.162 However, failing to include the homeless
would merely keep them invisible to the public, and their presence is
essential to remind society that they matter and have a right to use public
[https://perma.cc/ZQT6-K6JE] (reporting on how criminalizing the homeless negatively
impacts taxpayers in addition to the homeless).
156
See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the role of laws that seek to cleanse downtown areas of
the homeless).
157
See supra Part II.A.1 (offering a context of the criminalization of the homeless that allows
advocates to demonstrate the importance of advocating for the homeless).
158
See 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (stating there must be a likelihood that the message
would be understood by viewers given the societal context); see also MITCHELL, supra note 45,
at 128 (asserting the value of using public space for communicative purposes). Mitchell
states:
Public space often, though not always, originates as a representation of
space, as for example a courthouse square, a monumental plaza, a public
park, or a pedestrian shopping district. But as people use these spaces,
they also become representational spaces, appropriated in use. Public
space is thus socially produced through its use as public space.
MITCHELL, supra note 45, at 129 (internal citations omitted).
159
See MITCHELL, supra note 45, at 129 (arguing society fails to legitimize the homeless
when they remain invisible to the broader community).
160
See id. (noting the importance of public space as a forum for social change).
161
See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 291–92 (1984) (assuming
without deciding that protestors sleeping in tents could cast light on the plight of the
homeless); see also Vogel, supra note 64, at 560 (explaining onlookers who see the homeless
lined up will likely contemplate their situation).
162
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 1189 (summarizing public forums and the ability to
present a message to the public on public property). If groups decide not to use food at
protests, they could avoid the safety requirements and have an easier time satisfying an event
ordinance. See supra notes 65–73 and accompanying text (listing city ordinances and their
requirements for sharing food in public parks).
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space despite their economic situation. 163 In addition, offering food
ensures that people will show up given their primary concern for meeting
basic needs.164 Last, characterizing food distribution as expressive
conduct is not a new concept for the courts. 165 As groups continue to
challenge the proliferation of food-sharing laws, more opportunities will
arise to solidify its expressiveness through the courts.166
A final criticism is that the homeless may require some explanatory
speech because not everyone who passes by a park will instantly
understand the group’s particular message. 167 However, inherently
expressive conduct can rely on some explanation so long as it is not a
necessary component.168 In Rumsfeld, the Court stated that observers could
not glean from the context the law schools’ disapproval of the military’s
stance on homosexuality.169 The Court opined that observers might
conclude that recruiters selected another location out of convenience or
that the law schools’ interview rooms were full; thus, explanatory speech

163
See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text (emphasizing the importance of placing
the homeless in the public eye and allowing them to use public property); see also Baron,
supra note 57, at 1022–23 (positing that the “no property” legal situation of the homeless
explains why some advocates seek to protect the rights of the homeless through the courts
even though success in relation to panhandling, sleeping in public places, and sitting in
libraries only creates a “right to be homeless”).
164
See Watson, supra note 42, at 523 (stating the homeless are primarily concerned with
meeting their basic needs, which prevents them from focusing on other interests).
165
See supra Part II.B.1 (distinguishing between the approaches taken by the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuit regarding food sharing as inherently expressive conduct).
166
See Vogel, supra note 64, at 561 (calling for advocates to encourage courts to follow the
Ninth Circuit’s approach because it provided a more rigorous analysis while the O’Brien test
used by the Eleventh Circuit is too deferential; using the latter approach would drastically
limit an advocate’s ability to successfully protect the rights of homeless advocates).
167
See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006)
(expressing speech cannot be dependent on supplemental speech to explain the speaker’s
message).
168
See id. (reasoning that because it was necessary to explain the communicative value of
the law school’s conduct, there was “strong evidence that the conduct at issue . . . [was] not
so inherently expressive that it warrant[ed] protection under O’Brien”). The court explained
further:
If combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive
conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into
“speech” simply by talking about it. For instance, if an individual
announces that he intends to express his disapproval of the Internal
Revenue Service by refusing to pay his income taxes, we would have to
apply O’Brien to determine whether the Tax Code violates the First
Amendment. Neither O’Brien nor its progeny supports such a result.
Id.
169
See id. (stating the law schools’ actions were expressive only because they used
explanatory speech to supplement their conduct).
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was necessary to communicate their message.170 In contrast, society has
historically viewed the homeless as outcasts and a nuisance to society. 171
Thus, the homeless’ presence in a particular location triggers a more
visceral, communicative response than military personal recruiting from
different parts of a university campus, and it is not necessary to accompany
the food distribution with explanatory speech to convey a particular
message of inclusion. 172 Because distributing food to the homeless in a
public park is inherently expressive, the next step is to determine whether
the cities that have placed restrictions on food sharing in public space
comply with the First Amendment.173
B. Laws Regulating the Manner of Food Distribution
Fort Lauderdale, Florida’s outdoor food distribution ordinance is one
example of an ordinance attempting to regulate conduct while
incidentally impacting speech.174 Even though intermediate scrutiny
applies and O’Brien is usually deferential to the government, the
ordinance must be carefully reviewed.175
Assuming the ordinance is within the constitutional power of the
government, Fort Lauderdale likely clears the second hurdle of an

170
See id. (noting objective observers could not comprehend the significance of their
actions).
171
See supra Part II.A.1 (depicting how society has viewed the homeless throughout
history, and that in many situations, they were cast in a negative light).
172
See SHARE NO MORE, supra note 7, at 16 (describing complaints that resulted in cities
proposing food-sharing ordinances: homeless go to the bathroom outside, there is an
increase in crime, their mental state is uncertain, and the homeless pose a threat to the
community’s security). However, various homeless advocates claim that myths and illicit
motivations perpetuate these ordinances, and sharing food with the homeless does not
encourage homelessness. See Lindsey Bever, Fort Lauderdale Cracks Down on Feeding Homeless
in Public, Arrests 90-year-old Man Who Did It Anyway, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/11/05/fortlauderdale-cracks-down-on-feeding-homeless-in-public-arrests-90-year-old-man/
[https://perma.cc/Z8AM-TUXJ] (portraying the perceptions of homeless advocates who
disagree with Fort Lauderdale’s food-sharing ordinance).
173
See infra Part II.B.2 (explaining the constitutional requirements governments must
comply with to regulate expressive conduct).
174
See FT. LAUDERDALE, FLA. MUN. CODE §§ 47-18.31(b)(ii), (vii) (2015) (requiring groups
engaging in food sharing to remain 500 feet away from residential property, provide
handwashing equipment, and provide restrooms). This ordinance was one of five passed
within six months in Fort Lauderdale that affected the homeless. See Bever, supra note 172
(reporting about the aftermath of Fort Lauderdale’s food distribution ordinance). The other
laws allowed authorities to seize the property of the homeless until they could pay a fine;
another banned camping in public. Id.
175
See FARBER, supra note 77, at 39 (asserting the O’Brien test is very deferential towards
government regulations).
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important government interest.176 Although misguided, Fort Lauderdale
determined that providing social services to people has “serious
objectionable characteristics” that create adverse “secondary effects on
adjacent properties.”177 Homeless advocates will rightly argue that the
law is aimed at concerns that are not legitimate because the city’s bias
rings clear.178 However, protecting neighborhoods from superficial
negative consequences is legitimate because a pernicious legislative
motive will not preclude courts from upholding a law.179 Also, managing
the secondary effects that interfere with other residents and businesses is
similar to regulating competing interests on public property, which is a
legitimate purpose.180
Second, the ordinance does not suppress free expression. 181 The
ordinance applies broadly to numerous social service entities, so Fort
Lauderdale is not specifically targeting the speech of homeless advocates
who use food sharing to advocate for the poor. 182 Similar to the city in
O’Brien, Fort Lauderdale can offer numerous justifications for requiring
regulations such as food safety, proper sanitation, and property usage. 183
Homeless advocates may argue that the restriction still adversely impacts
groups who intentionally use social services to bring awareness to the
plight of the homeless, but Fort Lauderdale may take the position that it

176
See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (listing the four elements of the
O’Brien test).
177
See § 47-18.31(A) (explaining the purpose for Fort Lauderdale’s food ordinance). City
officials claimed the law allowed groups to distribute food legally, they just simply had to
satisfy the requirements of the ordinance. See Bever, supra note 172 (reporting on the
response from the city officials when they were asked about the law). Opponents of the law
fervently disagreed and chanted outside the Fort Lauderdale Commission’s chamber: “Hey,
Jack, what do you say? How many homeless did you starve today?” Id.
178
See § 47-18.31(A) (referring to the homeless and social services in general as having
“objectionable characteristics” and having “adverse secondary effects on adjacent
properties”).
179
See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383 (“Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a
hazardous matter.”).
180
See Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1038 (9th Cir.
2006) (emphasizing that regulating competing interests of a public property by local
governments is a substantial interest).
181
See Obrien, 391 U.S. at 377 (listing the second element of the O’Brien test which requires
a regulation to be “unrelated to the suppression of free expression”).
182
See §§ 47-18.31(A), (B)(6) (explaining the ordinance impacts all social service facilities
and not just Outdoor Food Distribution Centers).
183
See §§ 47-18.31(C)(2)(c)(i), (iv), (vi), (viii) (requiring groups to comply with county foodservice laws, mandating groups to provide restroom facilities or portable toilets for patrons
and servers, obligating one food server to be certified, and compelling groups to provide
hand-washing stations with free-flowing water).
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is not opposed to groups advocating for the poor because it merely wants
groups to conduct their behavior in a sanitary and harmless fashion. 184
Some authors have stated that the last element of the O’Brien test is
inconsequential.185 Despite the Court’s deferential treatment, Fort
Lauderdale’s ordinance goes beyond mere restrictions on conduct because
it grants property owners the ability to arbitrarily deny access to their
property when groups desire to feed the homeless outside.186 The
ordinance does not specifically say a permit is required, but this section
seems to move into the realm of a prior restraint.187 The government may
argue that this subsection protects the rights of private property owners,
but it does not narrowly construe permission to only private property, so
public property falls within the scope of the ordinance. 188 Therefore, this
requirement is problematic because groups could face capricious denials
from people and public entities that dislike the symbolic conduct of
homeless advocates.189
The 500-foot halo requirement between food sharing and other social
service facilities, residential areas, or food distribution centers is also
problematic.190 For example, in McCullen v. Coakley, the Court correctly
acknowledged that cities may not regulate expression when the burden
impacting the speech fails to further a city’s goals. 191 Although this section
may intend to spread social services throughout the city, some parks are
more convenient for the homeless due to limited transportation.192 Also,
184
See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 571 (1991) (reasoning an Indiana statute
that prohibited nude dancing was not prohibiting dancing outright, but simply restricted
people from dancing offensively in the nude); O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 381–82 (stating the court
allowed a law to impact the non-communicative element instead of the speech aspect of flag
burning).
185
See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining the last element in the O’Brien test is not routinely
enforced by the courts); see also Bhagwat, supra note 124, at 792 (arguing when applying
O’Brien, the Court does not enforce the last prong, and thus rarely upholds First Amendment
free speech claims).
186
See § 47-18.2(C)(2)(c)(vii) (“Shall provide written consent from the property owner to
conduct that activity on the property.”).
187
See supra Part II.C (articulating the role of prior restraints, in that they require prior
notice and permission before speaking).
188
See § 47-18.2(C)(2)(c)(vii) (failing to narrowly define “property owner” as a private
entity).
189
See supra Part II.C (explaining that prior restraints may preclude speech because
authorities may capriciously deny permits without good cause).
190
See §§ 47-18.31(C)(2)(c)(ii)–(iii) (preventing outdoor food distribution to be within 500
feet of other social service facilities or food distribution centers).
191
See 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2535 (2014) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799
(1989)) (requiring ordinances to further the government’s goals when the ordinance impacts
speech)).
192
See SHARE NO MORE, supra note 7, at 7, 10 (highlighting several key problems when
cities force groups to relocate because the homeless do not have transportation that allows
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homeless advocates may want to use specific parks because they provide
a better forum for reaching a particular audience.193 If a park that is
convenient and optimal for speech is near the area of a Salvation Army,
the group would be forced to select a less desirable location. 194 Fort
Lauderdale may argue that groups can picket instead of distributing food,
but involving the homeless is an integral component of their message
because it causes people to truly reflect on the situation of the homeless.195
Moreover, the city defines outdoor food distribution centers as providing
food without cost “as a social service,” which means that a church group
feeding its members or a company picnic is not subject to the 500-foot
requirement.196 These large groups are just as likely to cause disturbances,
and omitting them from the ordinance unfairly burdens the speech of one
particular group.197
C. Food-Sharing Laws That Impose Prior Restraints
Cities have regulated the conduct of individuals and groups, which
has incidentally impacted people who use food-sharing as a form of
speech in public fora.198 As previously mentioned, these regulations must

them to crisscross the city to attend a group feeding). The limited mobility that accompanies
homelessness has caused some counties to provide free public transportation to qualifying
individuals. See Cord Jefferson, Idea: Free Public Transportation for Homeless People, GOOD
(Feb. 6, 2011), https://www.good.is/articles/idea-free-public-transportation-for-homelesspeople [https://perma.cc/64M5-EVWM] (reporting on Santa Clara County’s initiative to
offer free public transportation to the homeless). The law allows the homeless to attend
medical appointments, job interviews, or other services. Id.
193
See SHARE NO MORE, supra note 7, at 4 (noting some groups intentionally strive to drive
the homeless away from their communities). Moreover, the homeless have difficulty finding
work because jobs are not always conveniently located near the homeless, and an inability
to afford transportation prevents them from securing a job. See Julia Acuna & Bob
Erlenbusch, Homeless Employment Report: Findings and Recommendations, NAT’L COAL. FOR
THE
HOMELESS
(Aug.
2009),
http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/
homelessemploymentreport/ [https://perma.cc/2GVH-35GQ] (explaining that lack of
transportation is a major preclusion to finding work for the homeless).
194
See § 47-18.31(C)(2)(d)(i) (preventing a social service facility from being within 500 feet
of another social service facility).
195
See Vogel, supra note 64, at 560 (stating that by watching the homeless line up, onlookers
can see a vivid picture of the current circumstances of the homeless and their demeanor).
196
See §§ 47-18.31(B)(4), (B)(6) (defining “social service” as providing food to address the
welfare of the public or offering food in combination with other services).
197
See Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1043 (9th Cir.
2006) (claiming large groups, whether demonstrating or engaged in athletics, could have a
significant impact on public space).
198
See §§ 47-18.31(A), (B)(4), (C)(2)(b)(i)–(vii) (codifying Fort Lauderdale’s attempt to
regulate conduct, which incidentally impacts the speech of groups that feed the homeless).
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be analyzed under O’Brien to verify their constitutionality. 199 Although
these laws may prevent people from engaging in food sharing, the most
egregious forms of preclusion take shape as prior restraints. 200 This Part
addresses city ordinances that create prior restraints by requiring groups
and individuals to obtain permits before engaging in food-sharing
activities with the homeless on public property. 201 Also prior restraints
are one of the worst forms of regulations, so it is imperative that cities
comply with constitutional requirements, especially because permit
schemes have deterred groups from feeding the homeless. 202 However,
before turning to the constitutional requirements of prior restraints, Part
III.C.1 argues that food-sharing ordinances are typically contentneutral.203 Last, Part III.C.2 asserts that the ordinances fail to comply with
constitutional requirements.204
1.

Food-Sharing Ordinances Are Content-Neutral Regulations

Drawing clear distinctions between content-based and contentneutral regulations that impact food sharing is not an easy task. 205
Oftentimes, understanding the impact regulations have on speech is
challenging and courts must examine the legislative history to ascertain
the legislative body’s intent.206 Some cities, such as Houston, plainly
articulate the reasons behind their ordinances. 207 Houston does not ban
199
See supra Part II.B.2 (describing how the Court relies on O’Brien to determine whether
regulations that incidentally impact speech are constitutional).
200
See supra Part II.C (describing the pernicious nature of prior restraints because they can
easily preclude speech from the marketplace of ideas).
201
See infra Parts III.C.1–2 (analyzing content-neutral permit schemes and their failure to
protect the speech rights of groups that feed the homeless because they lack mandatory
safeguards).
202
See SHARE NO MORE, supra note 7, at 9 (noting several groups have stopped feeding the
homeless in public parks because their applications get arbitrarily denied).
203
See infra Part III.C.1 (arguing that the majority of prior restraints impacting food sharing
are content-neutral); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 978 (describing the implications of
content-based and content-neutral laws).
204
See infra Part III.C.2 (asserting that prior restraints that impact food sharing in public
parks are unconstitutional because they fail to incorporate mandatory safeguards).
205
See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994)
(“Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always
a simple task.”).
206
See Carter & Clark, supra note 127, at 238 (2006) (explaining courts typically must
examine the legislative history to identify intent because the effect on speech caused by
regulations is oftentimes unclear).
207
See O’Hara, supra note 67 (citing the Houston’s mayor: “making it easier for people to
stay on the streets is not humane . . . [giving food to the homeless] keep[s] them on the street
longer, which is what happens when you feed them.”). However, determining “legislative
intent is often subjective and speculative.” Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content-Neutrality:
Inconsistent Applications of an Increasingly Malleable Doctrine, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 69, 108
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feeding the homeless outright, but its ordinance specifically limits
opportunities for speech by groups and individuals using food
distribution to advocate for the homeless. 208 Although the city may be
concerned about coordinating social services, it singles out giving food to
the homeless instead of regulating social services more generally. 209
However, other cities made an effort to ensure that ordinances apply to
everyone and not just charitable organizations. 210
Despite that these laws unfairly stop people from feeding the
homeless, classifying these ordinances as content-based is unlikely
because they seem primarily concerned with the secondary effects on
public property created by public feedings, such as interfering with other
activities and regulating space.211 Even if a court decides that the
(1997). In many situations, content-neutral and content-based objectives will be intertwined
and inseparable, which seems to be case in the food-sharing context because the regulations
can arguably be placed on conduct instead of the message itself. See id. at 107 (questioning
whether it is “really possible for a court rationally to extricate one purpose from another”).
“In some cases there simply will be both content-based and content-neutral objectives that
cannot be separated.” Id.
208
See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000) (finding
regulations that impacted only cable channels with sexual speech instead of all cable
channels content-based because the regulations focused on the content and its direct impact
on listeners).
209
See HOUSTON, TEX., MUN. CODE § 20-252 (2015) (prohibiting food service events on
public property without permits).
210
See SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 4.68.040 (2015) (incorporating its food
distribution laws into its special events ordinance).
211
See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 475 U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986) (concluding an ordinance
was content-neutral because it was primarily concerned with secondary effects of adult
video theatres on the broader community); see also Bhagwat, supra note 124, at 804
(articulating the secondary effects analysis has been extended to areas of the law outside the
context of sexually oriented businesses and conduct). The Sixth Circuit used the secondary
effects doctrine when analyzing a school rule that forbade schools from using undue
influence when recruiting students. See id. (providing examples of how courts have applied
the secondary effects doctrine in areas of the law not pertaining to sexually oriented
contexts).
Renton has been highly criticized by scholars because it “seems to confuse whether a
law is content-based or content-neutral with the question of whether a law is justified by a
sufficient purpose.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 981. According to Chemerinsky, the
law was content-based because it applied only to theaters showing adult films. See id.
(critiquing Renton even though the law was intended to combat crime surrounding adult
theaters); see also FARBER, supra note 77, at 138 (defining a “secondary effect” as a type of
“side-effect of speech that happens to be associated with particular types of content, but
which could in principle derive from other forms of speech”). Farber provided the following
example:
Suppose computer programmers were notorious for their use of drugs,
and that bookstores carrying computer-related books attracted drug
dealers to the area, increased neighborhood drug use, caused property
values to decline, and harmed the quality of urban life. Observing these
effects, a city council might desire to control the location of stores with
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secondary effects doctrine does not apply to this context because it does
not concern sexually explicit conduct, cities can argue that they help
manage limited public space, which the Ninth Circuit noted was a critical
reason for classifying the City of Santa Monica’s permit scheme as contentneutral.212
Although each ordinance would receive a case-by-case analysis, the
content-neutral permit schemes impacting food sharing will not be subject
to the prompt response requirement outlined in Freedman v. Maryland.213
Because a majority of these ordinances appear to fall within the contentneutral classification, the following Part analyzes the remaining
procedural requirements of prior restraints.214
2.

Food-Sharing Ordinances Fail to Comply with Prior Restraint
Requirements on Free Speech

The interests behind food sharing laws serve an important
government interest because the Court has upheld regulations that seek
to promote convenience and safeguard order within the public domain.215
books “Depicting Specified Computer Activities”, without in any way
disapproving of the books themselves or endorsing the views of
Luddites who disapprove of computers.
FARBER, supra note 77, at 138.
212
See Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1036 (9th Cir.
2006) (explaining the purpose of the ordinance was to coordinate use of the park instead of
precluding a particular expression). The Ninth Circuit also relied on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Thomas v. Chicago Park District to label the ordinance as content-neutral. See id.
(noting the decision was based on the “marked parallels between the Events Ordinance and
the ordinance at issue in Thomas”). The Ninth Circuit focused on three similar characteristics:
(1) “[n]one of the grounds for denying a permit has anything to do with
what a speaker might say”; (2) “the ordinance (unlike the classic
censorship scheme) is not even directed to communicative activity as
such, but rather to all activity conducted in a public park”; and (3) the
object of the permitting scheme was “to coordinate multiple uses of
limited space, to assure preservation of the park facilities, to prevent
uses that are dangerous, unlawful, or impermissible under the Park
District’s rules, and to assure financial accountability for damage caused
by the event” rather than to exclude expression based on any particular
content.
Id.
213
See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322, 325 (2002) (holding a “content-neutral
permit scheme regulating speech in a public forum [has never been required to] adhere to
the procedural requirements set forth in Freedman,” which required a prompt determination
by the government and an opportunity for prompt judicial review).
214
See infra Part III.C.2 (arguing prior restraints impacting food-sharing laws are
unconstitutional).
215
See Thomas, 534 U.S. at 322 (explaining content-neutral regulations that coordinate use
instead of precluding speech are acceptable prior restraints); see also Poulos v. New
Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 403 (1953) (upholding an ordinance that was a “ministerial, police

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2017

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 3 [2017], Art. 6

732

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

Accordingly, the City of Raleigh’s decision to withhold permits from
groups that interfere with other activities or create a nuisance within the
park is an important interest.216 Additionally, the City of Medford
appropriately uses permits to coordinate park behavior because events
and parades cannot impede traffic, create unreasonable hazards, or create
a nuisance through noise or any other violation.217 Last, other ordinances
are more vague and fail to state a purpose within the text of the
ordinance.218 Even so, courts could plausibly determine that these
ordinances are legitimate so long as cities can prove that the interest is
important.219
Despite having an important interest, many ordinances are
problematic because they lack clear objective criteria or grant considerable
discretion to one individual.220 Ambiguous terminology, non-existent
standards, and unguided discretion are characteristics of ordinances that
lack adequate review standards.221 A similar problem has occurred where
cities understandably require permits, but the code fails to disclose the
decision making process.222 In contrast, the food-sharing ordinance
routine for adjusting the rights of citizens so that the opportunity for effective freedom of
speech may be preserved.”); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) (regulating a
public forum to ensure convenience and to “safeguard[] the good order upon which [civil
liberties] ultimately depend” because such is a legitimate interest).
216
See RALEIGH, N.C., MUN. CODE § 9-2022(d) (2015) (explaining the Chief of Police has the
discretion to deny submitted applications for permits).
217
See MEDFORD, OR, MUN. CODE § 2.185(1)–(9) (2015) (describing the criteria that City
Managers may use when deciding to approve or decline a permit).
218
See MYRTLE BEACH, S.C., MUN. CODE § 14-316(f)(3) (2015) (“Not more than one large
group feeding facility use permits may be issued to a person, or persons acting in cooperation
through joint purpose however loosely associated within a 12-month period.”).
219
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 1011 (explaining the necessary requirements of
licensing schemes that make them constitutional).
220
See, e.g., RALEIGH, N.C., MUN. CODE § 9-2022(d) (2015) (granting sole discretion to the
Chief of Police to approve or deny permits); MEDFORD, OR, MUN. CODE § 2.185(1) (2015)
(allowing the City Manager to deny or approve permits); COLUMBIA, S.C., MUN. CODE § 152(a) (2015) (giving discretion to the Director of the Parks and Recreation Department to deny
permits when protecting “the public health, safety, security, peace, order, welfare and
convenience”); MANCHESTER, N.H., MUN. CODE § 117.17 (2015) (requiring a written
application for a permit without specifying applicable review standards); see supra Part II.C
(discussing the importance of having objective review standards in city ordinances to avoid
giving an administrative official sole discretion over permits);.
221
See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 770 (1988) (explaining
standards must be included in the text of city laws); see also City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S.
451, 468 (1987) (holding an ordinance was not subject to a limiting construction because the
text was unambiguous); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150–51 (1969)
(articulating that unbridled discretion in one official to approve or disapprove a permit is
unconstitutional).
222
See MYRTLE BEACH, S.C., MUN. CODE § 14-316(f)(2) (2015) (requiring a department of
health and environmental control permit without stipulating application requirements); see
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upheld by the Ninth Circuit undoubtedly articulated when the city denies
a permit.223 More cities should follow the City of Santa Monica’s lead
because the government “cannot vest restraining control over the right to
speak . . . in an administrative official where there are no appropriate
standards to guide his action.”224
Similarly, other cities’ ordinances are problematic. For example, in
Houston, Texas the private or public property owner must give
permission to groups hoping to distribute food, and in Medford, the city
allows the city manager to decide whether food sharing will become a
nuisance or cause a hazardous condition.225 These requirements appear
to grant too much unfettered discretion to one individual because the
decisions are prone to the individual tastes and preferences of the decision
makers.226
Last, numerous ordinances failed to effectively identify the size of the
group that the ordinances impact.227 The City of Houston’s permit scheme
affects groups of five or more people, the City of Columbia’s ordinance
applies to groups of twenty-five or more people, and other ordinances

also MANCHESTER, N.H., MUN. CODE § 117.17 (2015) (obligating individuals to submit a
permit application to the requisite Health Authority without providing information about
how decisions are made when approving or denying permits).
223
SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 4.68.070 (listing several reasons for denying a
permit: making a misleading or fraudulent statement, failing to include all necessary
information, failing to satisfy all requirements, leaving out a payment, damaging city
property, failing to show proof of insurance or sign an indemnification paper before using
public property).
224
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951). See Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement,
505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992) (finding a law unconstitutional because it lacked “articulated
standards either in the ordinance or the county’s established practice”).
225
See HOUSTON, TEX., MUN. CODE § 20-252 (2015) (mandating permission to use private or
public property from the owners); see also MEDFORD, OR, MUN. CODE § 2.185(1) (2015) (giving
the City Manager discretion to deny permit applications).
226
See Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 151 (allowing governmental authorities to approve or deny
permits without universal standards lends itself to subjectivity). According to Kellum, “A
system of prior restraints must possess well-defined and sufficiently narrow guidelines to
direct the governing body’s decision[-]making. Such guidelines must be truly objective in
order to prevent . . . [making decisions] based on tastes, preferences, or biases.” Kellum,
supra note 128, at 415.
227
See supra Part II.C. (providing an overview of permit scheme requirements and noting
the importance of regulating large groups instead of small groups); see also Grossman v. City
of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1206–07 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasizing some groups could not
engage in spontaneous speech). Although the Court has not defined a specific group size,
circuit courts have upheld group sizes ranging from twenty-five to one hundred and fifty
people. See First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 638 F.3d 756, 759, 761–62
(11th Cir. 2011) (holding a group-size of twenty-five people was narrowly tailored); Santa
Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1043 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding
a group-size of 150 people was narrowly tailored).
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blatantly omitted a definition of group size.228 Moreover, other ordinances
do not even allow one person to distribute food spontaneously. 229 Even
though larger groups likely organize and plan these food-sharing events,
these ordinances lack this important requirement.230
IV. CONTRIBUTION
Laws targeting the homeless have a long tradition in the United
States.231 These laws have fluctuated throughout the centuries, but
recently regained steam in the wake of the Great Recession. 232 Although
some of these laws pass constitutional muster, others do not and have
precluded groups from using group feedings to advocate for the homeless
by using permit schemes and other onerous regulations to create unfair
barriers.233 Cities must draft reasonable ordinances because “many
[content-neutral] prior restraints [in the context of licensing] are now
presumed constitutional and may be immediately effected unless and
until the speech proponent goes to court and carries the burden to show
that speech should be protected.”234 Therefore, cities must modify their
See, e.g., MEDFORD, OR, MUN. CODE § 2.185(1) (noting the ordinance applies to events or
parades); COLUMBIA, S.C., MUN. CODE § 15-2(a) (2015) (characterizing the size of impacted
groups); HOUSTON, TEX., MUN. CODE § 20-251 (asserting permit requirements apply to
groups of five or more people).
229
See, e.g., MANCHESTER, N.H., MUN. CODE § 117.15 (2015) (proscribing food distribution
by any person).
230
See O’Hara, supra note 67 (reporting some people have stopped giving their food to the
homeless in response to the food-sharing ordinance passed by the city because it prohibits
individuals from distributing food).
231
See supra Part II.A (portraying the history of the homeless in the United States).
232
See supra Part II.A (explaining the increase in homelessness during the Great Recession).
233
See supra Part II.A.2 (describing the barriers that the homeless face when cities enact
laws used to criminalize them).
234
Carter & Clark, supra note 127, at 226. According to Carter and Clark, the Supreme
Court has slowly carved away procedural safeguards outlined in Freedman because many of
the dangers associated with prior restraints are diminished when prior restraint laws are
content-neutral. See id. (explaining Supreme Court decisions since 2002 regarding contentneutral prior restraints). According to one scholar, content-neutral laws are less harmful
because speech is reduced “equally across the full range of ideas and topics . . . rather than
entailing selective government regulation of particular messages.” Calvert, supra note 207,
at 75. However, there are two major implications of content-neutral laws and the court’s
evisceration of requisite procedural safeguards:
First, courts sometimes have not required procedural safeguards even
when prior restraints were content-based. Second, federal courts of
appeals uniformly have interpreted two Supreme Court opinions since
2002 to mean that the First Amendment no longer requires a time limit
on the initial administrative decision about whether to allow speech in
a content-neutral prior restraint licensing scheme. Elimination of the
time-limit requirement, which constituted the essence of Freedman’s
concern for ensuring due process in case of threatened speech
228
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ordinances that manage public space to ensure full compliance with
constitutional safeguards. By doing so, cities can appropriately regulate
public space without stripping groups and individuals of their First
Amendment rights. Part IV.A proposes a model ordinance for cities to
adopt, and Part IV.B explains why these changes are necessary.
A. Proposed Ordinance
This Part proposes an amended ordinance for cities to adopt. 235
Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter or other
applicable law, rule or regulation or any permit or license
issued hereunder or pursuant to the terms of a permit,
lease, or contract which has been specifically authorized
by the City Council, a community event permit shall be
required to be obtained from the Parks and Recreation
Committee Community Event Committee for the
following activities:
(a) A parade, procession, march or assembly
consisting of persons, animals, vehicles, or any
other combination thereof, which is to assemble
or travel in unison on any public street, highway,
alley, sidewalk or other City-designated public
way and which either: (1) may impede, obstruct,
impair or interfere with free use of such public
street, highway, alley, sidewalk, or other public
way owned, controlled, or maintained by the
City; or (2) does not comply with normal or usual
traffic regulations or controls.
(b) Any activity or event on City owned, controlled,
or maintained property not subject to the
requirements of subsection (a) of this Section,
involving one hundred fifty or more persons, one
hundred (100) or more persons. involving seventyfive or more persons on the Santa Monica Third
Street Promenade.

deprivation, may allow government to suppress speech it disfavors even while
maintaining the appearance of content neutrality.
Carter & Clark, supra note 127, at 226 (emphasis added).
235
The ordinance uses language from sections 4.68.040 and 4.68.060 of the Santa Monica
Municipal Code, which was reviewed by the Ninth Circuit. Amendments are italicized and
deleted content has been struck.
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(c) Spontaneous events which are occasioned by
news or affairs coming into public knowledge
less than forty-eight hours prior to such event
may be conducted on the lawn of City Hall
without the organizers first having to obtain a
community event permit. If practicable, the
organizers should give notice to the City’s
Community Events Office at least four hours
prior to the event informing the City of the date
and time of the event and providing an estimate
of the approximate number of persons who will
be participating.
(d) To apply for a permit, groups and individuals must:
(i) Submit an application forty-eight hours before an
event, and the Board will issue a prompt response;
and
(ii) The applicable fee must be paid unless offering
services to indigent populations
a. Waiver of the fee requires groups to pick up
their own trash.
(e) All applications are reviewed by the Committee and no
individual member has sole discretion. The Parks and
Recreation Committee shall issue a community
event permit, if it is determined that all of the
following criteria have been met:
(i) The event does not unreasonably or unfeasibly
burden City resources necessary to preserve
the public’s use of the street or other
property.
(ii) The event does not unduly impede, obstruct,
or interfere with the operation of emergency
vehicles or equipment in or through the
particular permit area.
(iii) The proposed use, event, or activity does not
otherwise present a substantial or
unwarranted safety, noise, or traffic hazard.
(iv) The proposed event will not cause other
adverse impacts on health or safety to
surrounding residential or commercial uses,
which cannot be effectively mitigated.
(iv) Consideration may not be given to: the
event’s message, the content of speech, the
identity or associational relationship of the
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applicant, or the assumptions regarding the
amount of hostility towards the message or
speech conveyed by the group or event.
B. Commentary
This ordinance is the best solution for two main reasons. First, the
proposed ordinance corrects deficiencies found in existing city
ordinances.236 One important restriction requires ordinances to allow
spontaneous speech.237 This ordinance applies to large groups, which is
defined as one hundred people, so groups smaller than one hundred can
spontaneously engage in food distribution without facing arrest or harsh
fines for violating a statute.238 Critics may argue that the Ninth Circuit
stated that anything less than 150 persons could be unconstitutional. 239
However, the Supreme Court has not established a particular number, and
100 is a reasonable compromise because the Ninth Circuit warned that a
group of 150 people could interfere with park activities.240
Additionally, this ordinance incorporates objective review
standards.241 The ordinance specifically assures applicants that objective
review standards are used to grant or deny an application. 242 Also, the
review process is conducted by a committee instead of individuals, which
satisfies the Supreme Court’s requirement of not granting too much
discretion to individuals.243 Furthermore, the proposed ordinance plainly
articulates that the message, content, association, or popularity of the
speech are not factors used by the Board to grant or deny permission to
engage in a public demonstration, which should help prevent arbitrary

236
See supra Parts III.B–C (analyzing various city ordinances and identifying their
deficiencies).
237
See supra Part II.C (describing the necessary requirements of prior restraints).
238
See supra Part IV.A (stating the ordinance applies to groups of one-hundred or more
people).
239
See Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1043 n.17 (9th
Cir. 2006) (opining that anything less than 150 people may be unconstitutional).
240
See Kellum, supra note 128, at 406–08 (arguing even though the Supreme Court looks to
the size of the group to determine the constitutionality of an ordinance, no concrete number
has been provided by the Court); see also Santa Monica Food Not Bombs, 450 F.3d at 1043
(quoting that “[g]roups of 150 or more people, whether demonstrating or playing soccer, are
by any measure sufficiently large enough to affect or ‘have an impact on’” park use).
241
See supra Part II.C (explaining permit schemes must have objective review standards).
242
See supra Part IV.A (including objective criteria the city must use when reviewing
applications for permits).
243
See supra Part II.C (noting cities may not give sole discretion to one person when
reviewing applications for a permit).
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denials for groups and individual that apply for permits to use foodsharing as symbolic speech.244
Last, the proposed ordinance assures applicants receive a prompt
response.245 The ordinance distinctly articulates that applications are
subject to prompt review, which prevents prolonged consideration that
could potentially preclude speech.246 Removing the portion that requires
consent from neighbors also helps avoid speech preclusion or unnecessary
delays.247
Many city ordinances include fees for permits.248 In the interest of city
management and economy, the ordinance also added a fee clause to help
with upkeep of the property.249 But, the ordinance provides an exception
for services offered to indigent populations because food advocates
complain that permits are cost prohibitive. 250
Critics will argue that because a prior restraint is the worst restraint
on speech, it should not be recommended as a means to regulate free
speech.251 However, even though the Court is cautious about permit
schemes, it requires several safeguards to protect the interests of speakers
if a permit scheme is used.252 Given the deferential nature of the O’Brien
test and the time, place, and manner analyses, having more protections in
place through a prior restraint is more preferable, and prior restraints are
more prone to receive strict scrutiny analysis given their presumption of
invalidity.253
Homeless advocates will also argue that these ordinances should be
removed, and cities should concentrate resources on the alleviation of

See SHARE NO MORE, supra note 7, at 9 (noting several groups have stopped feeding the
homeless due to arbitrary denials by governing officials).
245
See supra Part II.C (noting permit schemes must ensure a prompt response from city
officials).
246
See supra Part IV.A (including language that requires a prompt response for applicants
to rely on when submitting applications for a permit).
247
See supra Part IV.A (striking out language that gives private property owners the ability
to preclude speech by declining to give consent to a food-sharing event on their property).
248
See e.g., SHARE NO MORE, supra note 7, at 12 (explaining some cities charge $800 per
permit).
249
See supra Part IV.A (including a fee for events on public property).
250
See SHARE NO MORE, supra note 7, at 12 (asserting permit schemes have stopped groups
from feeding the homeless because they are cost-prohibitive).
251
See supra Part II.C (describing the danger of prior restraints due to their potential to
preclude speech).
252
See supra Part II.C (discussing the requirements of prior restraints and necessary
safeguards).
253
See supra Part II.C (describing the type of scrutiny and necessary requirements for
permit schemes).
244
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homelessness.254 Cities should take a multifaceted approach to addressing
homelessness because a regulation alone will not address the complex
issues related to homelessness.255 However, as cities seek to address
homelessness, groups will continue to feed the homeless in public parks
until additional programs and efforts provide sufficient resources to the
homeless.256 Therefore, this ordinance is the best option for managing
public space in the interim, and it helps protect the interests of all users
while simultaneously protecting the rights of homeless advocates.
V. CONCLUSION
Throughout history, the homeless have been subject to harsh laws and
negative perceptions.257 Laws that cities are enacting to discourage people
today, like Mr. Abbott, from feeding the homeless are merely an extension
of this historical framework.258 Even though opinions of the homeless and
their contributions to society has vacillated, they should retain the right to
promote their interests to the public. 259 Otherwise, more “prominent”
interests dominate the political landscape, and their interests remain in the
dark.260 To ensure protection of these rights, relying on the First
Amendment is an important step for advocates to take. 261
Homeless advocates, such as Mr. Abbott, should be able to rely on
carefully drafted ordinances that protect their First Amendment rights. 262
Cities have a right to regulate public space, but they also must abide by

254
See supra note 26 and accompanying text (explaining the policy recommendations for
cities related to collaboration with food providers, encouraging restaurants to accept food
stamps, and working with state and federal advocates to ensure that the homeless receive
basic needs such as housing and healthcare).
255
See Watson, supra note 42, at 527 (noting mental illness, lack of housing, societal
structures, and economic realities contribute to homelessness).
256
See Bever, supra note 172 (reporting people feel compelled to feed the homeless because
of their faith, and many willfully violate the ordinances because they do not want to turn the
homeless away).
257
See supra Part II.A.1 (portraying the public’s perception of the homeless since Colonial
times).
258
See supra Part II.A.2 (expounding upon new efforts to criminalize the homeless and
chronicling the history of laws that have negatively targeted the homeless).
259
See supra Part II.B (outlining the rights of homeless advocates when feeding the
homeless on public property).
260
See supra note 158 and accompanying text (articulating public space is essential for
groups to advocate on behalf of the homeless and for the homeless to be legitimate members
of society).
261
See supra Part II.B.2 (describing First Amendment protections regarding speech and
public space).
262
See supra Part IV.A (proposing an ordinance that protects the speech rights of groups
that feed the homeless in public parks).
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constitutional requirements.263 These unconstitutional ordinances have
caused groups to refrain from feeding the homeless or to incur
unnecessary fines and charges from engaging in such behavior.264 In
conjunction with other efforts, cities should adopt the proposed ordinance
because it strikes a balance between the interests of cities, advocates, and
the homeless.265 Moreover, it incorporates necessary safeguards outlined
by the Supreme Court, which protects First Amendment rights and grants
advocates like Mr. Abbott reasonable opportunities to break bread with
those in need.266
Caleb Detweiler

263
See supra Part II.B.2 (elaborating on when cities may regulate conduct on public
property).
264
See supra Part I (narrating Mr. Abbott’s charges after he willfully violated a city
ordinance).
265
See supra Part IV.A (proposing a model ordinance that balances the interests of cities
and homeless advocates).
266
See supra Part IV.A (listing safeguards such as objective review standards, a review
board, and protections for spontaneous speech).
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